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INTRODUCTION
An affiliated corporate group consists of two or more corporations
linked by sufficient stock ownership to cause them to function as an eco-
nomic unit instead of as independent economic actors.1 Thus, an affiliated
corporate group engaged in international business is often referred to as a
multinational enterprise (MNE), a term that we will use throughout this
Article.
When corporate members of an MNE engage in transactions among
themselves, the prices they employ (transfer prices) will significantly affect
the amount of overall MNE income that is allocated to each member and,
hence, to the tax bases of the various countries in which the members are
resident or do business. Because MNE members have common ultimate
owners and function as and comprise an economic unit, they share a com-
1. Tax systems usually include provisions specifying the degree of relationship
through stockholding that is necessary for two or more corporations to be treated for tax
purposes as a single taxpayer or its rough equivalent. The Internal Revenue Code contains
several such explicit or implicit provisions. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 902(a) (2014) (specifying de-
gree of relationship required for a domestic parent corporation to qualify for an indirect or
“deemed paid” foreign tax credit with respect to dividends received from a foreign subsidiary
corporation); 957(a) (2014) (specifying degree of relationship necessary for a foreign corpo-
ration to be regarded as a controlled foreign corporation with respect to United States share-
holders); 1504(a) (2014) (specifying degree of relationship required for a corporate group to
be allowed to file a consolidated return). These types of provisions require additional com-
plex provisions to deal with issues of indirect ownership, including through tiered entity
structures. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 318, 544, 958, 1298(a) (2014). These are technical, albeit impor-
tant, matters that shed no light on this Article’s principal topics. Consequently, we will dis-
cuss only scenarios in which the corporate players would clearly be treated as comprising an
economic unit. We, however, do believe that the rationalization, simplification, and moderni-
zation of these indirect ownership rules are warranted, but that topic is properly the subject
of a separate article.Fall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 3
mon economic objective—maximization of the MNE’s aggregate after-tax
profits. Consequently, the prices they charge in intra-MNE transactions
will be set to achieve this objective instead of maximizing the after-tax
profits of individual MNE members, as each member would try to do if it
were an independent actor bargaining with other members at arm’s length.
This leads to the phenomenon of tax-motivated transfer pricing, which in-
volves setting prices in intra-MNE transactions that are higher or lower
than an arm’s-length price so that income is shifted to the country or coun-
tries that confer the most favorable tax consequences on the MNE as a
whole.2
With respect to the United States, the result of this dynamic is that
MNEs engage in aggressive transfer pricing that results in much more in-
come disappearing from the U.S. tax base and showing up in the tax bases
of low- or zero-tax foreign countries than would be the case if the MNE
members acted like independent parties when setting prices among them-
selves.3 An extensive body of recent literature has documented how the
U.S. corporate income tax base is being decimated by aggressive transfer
pricing and other strategies that shift income into low- or zero-tax foreign
countries.4 This phenomenon has provoked a lively debate over whether
2. See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH,
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 710–11 (4th ed. 2011); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
& Ilan Benshalom, Formulary Apportionment–Myths and Prospects, 2011 WORLD T AX J.
371, 373, 378 (2011); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allo-
cating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9
FLA. TAX REV. 497, 500 (2009); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., An Imputation System for Taxing
Foreign-Source Income, 130 TAX NOTES 567, 570 (2011).
Aggressive transfer pricing is effective in part because corporations related through
stock ownership nonetheless are treated as separate taxpayers and the contracts they make
between themselves are generally respected for tax law purposes. See Martin A. Sullivan,
How to Prevent the Great Escape of Residual Profits, 141 TAX NOTES 13, 14 (2013). For this
reason, the arm’s-length pricing method is sometimes referred to in the literature as “sepa-
rate accounting.” See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra, at 499; Lorence L. Bravenec,
Connecting the Dots in U.S. International Taxation, 27 TAX NOTES INT’L 845 (2002); Lee A.
Sheppard, The Twilight of the International Consensus, 141 TAX NOTES 7, 8–9 (2013) [herein-
after Sheppard, Twilight].
3. See Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of Multinational Com-
pany Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are Being Globalized, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 247, 268
(2012) [hereinafter Grubert, Foreign Taxes]; Martin A. Sullivan, Pfizer’s Tax Picture Domi-
nated by U.S. Losses, Repatriation, 140 TAX NOTES 103 (2013); Martin A. Sullivan, Transfer
Pricing Abuse is Job-Killing Corporate Welfare, 128 TAX NOTES 461 (2010) [hereinafter Sulli-
van, Job-Killing]; Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Multinationals Paying Less Foreign Tax, 118 TAX
NOTES 1177 (2008); Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Multinationals Shifting Profits Out of the United
States, 118 TAX NOTES 1078 (2008); see also Hearing on Transfer Pricing Issues Before the H.
Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 1, 8–9, 11 (2010) (statement of Stephen E. Shay,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs, U.S. Treas. Dep’t) (reporting sub-
stantial income shifting to lower-tax countries, citing evidence from company tax data of
margin increases correlated inversely with effective tax rates); U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, 110TH
CONG., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON EARNINGS STRIPPING, TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S. IN-
COME TAX TREATIES 55–61 (2007) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING]
4. See, e.g,. CONG. BUDGET O FFICE, OPTIONS FOR T AXING U.S. MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 16 (Jan. 2013) [hereinafter CBO, OPTIONS]; Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, supra4 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
the best response by the United States is to replace its present interna-
tional income tax regime with a global formulary apportionment system.5
This system employs a rigid mathematical formula to allocate an MNE’s
aggregate worldwide income6 among MNE members with the allocations
being taxed in the respective countries in which members have assets or
activities.
The present U.S. international income tax system addresses the prob-
lem of aggressive transfer pricing through the so-called arm’s-length
method of income allocation. This methodology seeks to override intra-
MNE transfer prices and replace them with prices that the parties would
have used had they been independent actors. Critics argue that the arm’s-
length method is ineffective for this purpose and that a global formulary
apportionment method of income allocation would be a much better re-
straint on aggressive transfer pricing.7
note 2, at 373–75; Kimberly A. Clausing, Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and Tax Policy,
62 NAT’L TAX J. 703, 703–04, 711, 717 (2009); Grubert, Foreign Taxes, supra note 3; Edward
D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 737–50 (2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard,
Stateless Income]; Stafford Smiley & Victor Jaramillo, Me, Myself and My Subsidiary: A Shift
in the Intent Standard in Related-Party Hybrid Debt Cases, 40 J. CORP. TAX’N 16 (Sept./Oct.
2013); Martin A. Sullivan, “Stateless Income” is Key to International Reform, 131 TAX NOTES
1315 (2011) [hereinafter Sullivan, Key to Reform]. The United States is not alone in facing
this problem. See G20 FINANCE M INISTERS AND C ENTRAL B ANK G OVERNORS’ MEETING,
COMMUNIQU ´ E ¶ 20 (Feb. 15, 2013), available at http://www.g20.org/events_financial_track/
20130215/780960861.html; George Osborne, Pierre Moscovici & Wolfgang Sch¨ auble, We are
Determined that Multinationals will not Avoid Tax, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2013, available at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6b12990e-76bc-11e2-ac91-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2O6zw5evg.
5. See Barbara Angus, Tom Neubig, Eric Solomon & Mark Weinberger, The U.S.
International Tax System at a Crossroads, 127 TAX NOTES 45, 64 (2010); Avi-Yonah, Clausing
& Durst, supra note 2; Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Analysis
of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International Tax, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 671, 704–07
(2013) [hereinafter Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the System]; Lee A. Sheppard, Is Transfer
Pricing Worth Salvaging? 136 TAX NOTES 467 (2012) [hereinafter Sheppard, Transfer Pric-
ing]; David D. Stewart, IRS Official Defends Arm’s-Length Standard, 126 TAX NOTES 298
(2010); Sullivan, Job-Killing, supra note 3, at 465.
6. For this purpose, worldwide income excludes profits generated by intra-MNE
transactions and is limited to income earned by members in transactions with outsiders. See
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SPILLOVERS IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION
39 (2014) [hereinafter IMF, SPILLOVERS]; Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, supra note 2, at 380; Avi-
Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 540–41 (2009); Brian Lebowitz, Profit Sharing as a
New World Order in International Taxation, 52 TAX N OTES I NT’L 585, 589–90 (2008); H.
David Rosenbloom, Angels on a Pin: Arm’s Length in the World, 38 TAX NOTES INT’L 523
(2005) [hereinafter Rosenbloom, Angels on a Pin]; Sheppard, Transfer Pricing, supra note 5,
at 468–69.
7. See e.g., Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 501–07, 510–13; Bravenec,
supra note 2; Michael C. Durst, A Statutory Proposal for U.S. Transfer Pricing Reform, 115
TAX NOTES 1047, 1050 (2007) [hereinafter Durst, Statutory Proposal]; Julie Roin, Can the
Income Tax Be Saved? The Promises and Pitfalls of Adopting Worldwide Formulary Appor-
tionment, 61 TAX L. REV. 169, 172–73 (2008) [hereinafter Roin, Can the Income Tax Be
Saved?]; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the
Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX. REV. 89 (1995); Michael C. Durst, The
President’s International Tax Proposals in Historical and Economic Perspective, 54 TAX
NOTES INT’L 747 (2009); Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’sFall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 5
Transfer pricing is an important tool in the taxpayer’s arsenal for shift-
ing income to low- or no-tax countries. Consequently, we note that tax law
commentators have recently produced an impressive body of work analyz-
ing various ways in which aggressive transfer pricing is combined with
other income-shifting strategies to create foreign-source income that bears
low or no foreign tax.8 In modern parlance, this income is frequently re-
ferred to as stateless or homeless income.9
In spite of the importance of this topic under current U.S. interna-
tional tax rules, low-taxed foreign-source income would possess no unique
value in the U.S. tax system if the United States had a properly designed
worldwide system of residence taxation. Under such a system, full U.S.
residual taxation10 would be imposed on low-taxed foreign income of U.S.
residents as the income was earned. Thus, the benefit of low or no foreign
Length, 30 TAX NOTES 625 (1986); Lebowitz, supra note 6; Dale W. Wickham & Charles J.
Kerester, New Directions Needed for Solution of the International Transfer Pricing Tax Puz-
zle: Internationally Agreed Rules or Tax Warfare?, 56 TAX NOTES 339 (1992).
8. See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Formula Apportionment: Is It Better
Than The Current System and Are There Better Alternatives?, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 1145, 1181
(2010) [hereinafter Altshuler & Grubert, Formula Apportionment]; Ilan Benshalom, Rethink-
ing the Source of the Arm’s-Length Transfer Pricing Problem, 32 VA. TAX REV. 425, 445–48
(2013) [hereinafter Benshalom, Rethinking]; Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 4; Ed-
ward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99 (2011) [hereinafter
Kleinbard, Lessons]; Lee A. Sheppard, Globalization and International Tax Rules, 139 TAX
NOTES 587 (2013); Martin A. Sullivan, The Other Problem with Cost Sharing, 139 TAX NOTES
973 (2013); Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Contract Manufacturing and Dave Camp’s Option C, 139
TAX NOTES 10 (2013); Bret Wells, “Territorial” Tax Reform: Homeless Income is the Achilles
Heel, 12 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Wells, Homeless Income]; Bret Wells
& Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless Income: Collection at Source Is the Linchpin,
65 TAX L. REV. 535 (2012) [hereinafter Wells & Lowell, Base Erosion]; Bret Wells & Cym
Lowell, Tax Base Erosion: Reformation of Section 482’s Arm’s Length Standard, 15 FLA. TAX
REV. 737 (2014). Earlier commentary on this topic includes the following: ABA Tax’n Sec.,
Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59 TAX L AW. 649, 738–39 (2006)
[hereinafter ABA Tax’n Sec., Report]; David Buss, David Hryck & Alan Granwell, Interna-
tional Tax Strategies with Intercompany Debt, 85 TAXES 9 (Oct. 2007); Mike Cooper, Gary
Melcher, & Clint Stretch, Suddenly Saving Foreign Taxes Is Abusive? An Untenable Propo-
sal, 79 TAX NOTES 885 (1998); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., American Offshore Business Tax Plan-
ning: Can Australian Lawyers Get A Piece of the Action?, 8 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. ANNUAL
215 (2003); David S. Miller, The Strange Materialization of the Tax Nothing, 87 TAX NOTES
685, 699 (2000); Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 191–92; Stephen E.
Shay, Revisiting U.S. Anti-Deferral Rules, 74 TAXES 1042, 1055–60 (1996); see also STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATED TO POSSIBLE INCOME
SHIFTING AND TRANSFER PRICING (2010) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., INCOME SHIFTING]; U.S.
TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 3; Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the System,
supra note 5, at 686 (“[I]f hybrid entities in tax havens can be used, investment incentives are
the same as if the host countries for operating subsidiaries had lowered their tax rates.”).
9. See, e.g., Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 4; Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note
8; Wells, Homeless Income, supra note 8; Wells & Lowell, Base Erosion, supra note 8.
10. U.S. residual tax is the U.S. income tax liability that remains after a credit for
foreign income tax is subtracted from the U.S. income tax that would be imposed if no credit
were allowed.6 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
income taxation would be negated by the U.S. residual tax.11 Low-taxed
foreign income has value under the current U.S. international income tax
system principally because the deferral12 and cross-crediting13 features of
that system allow the U.S. residual tax to be eliminated or substantially
reduced.14 Stated differently, U.S. resident taxpayers who are properly ad-
vised with respect to deferral and cross-crediting find that their low-taxed
foreign income has value because, effectively, deferred earnings are rein-
vested at higher after-tax rates offshore and, often, there is little or no U.S.
residual tax.15 Within the U.S. tax system,16 deferral and cross-crediting
are the essential value creators with respect to stateless/homeless in-
come.17 Indeed, even without stateless/homeless income strategies to en-
hance their benefit, deferral and cross-crediting provide a strong incentive
11. If the zero-taxed foreign income of U.S. residents were taxed by the United States
as it was earned, the U.S. residual tax on that income would be the full U.S. tax minus a
credit for foreign tax imposed on that income and the total tax would be the sum of the
foreign tax and the U.S. residual tax. But if there were no foreign tax, the credit would be
zero and the full U.S. tax would be due. See generally Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 8, at
153–54.
12. Deferral is the feature of the U.S. international income tax system that allows U.S.
residual tax on the foreign-source income of a U.S.-owned foreign corporation to be deferred
until the income is distributed to U.S. resident shareholders or until the U.S. resident share-
holders sell shares of the foreign corporation at a price that reflects the corporation’s accu-
mulated income. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 25, 485; J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse Than Exemption, 59 EMORY L.
REV. 79, 85–104 (2009) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than Exemption].
13. Cross-crediting occurs when foreign tax credits in excess of U.S. tax on high-taxed
foreign-source income are used to reduce the U.S. residual tax on low- or zero-taxed foreign-
source income. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 4 at 7–9; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than
Exemption, supra note 12, at 132–37.
14. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than Exemption, supra note 12; see also JOINT
COMM., INCOME SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 5–6.
15. Regarding the possibility of going below zero and creating a negative U.S. tax, see
Martin A. Sullivan, Negative Foreign Effective Tax Rates, 139 TAX NOTES 698 (2013); Flem-
ing, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than Exemption, supra note 12, at 132–49.
16. Financial reporting rules also encourage U.S. multinational corporations to earn
and accumulate income in low-tax foreign countries. See Roy Clemons, Kirsten Cook &
Michael R. Kinney, U.S. Corporate Tax Reform and Financial Reporting Incentives, 141 TAX
NOTES 92 (2013); Michael P. Donohoe, Gary A. McGill & Edmund Outslay, Through a Glass
Darkly: What Can We Learn About a U.S. Multinational Corporation’s International Opera-
tions from Its Financial Statement Disclosures?, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 961, 970–72, 975–79 (2012);
Christopher H. Hanna, The Real Value of Tax Deferral, 61 FLA. L. REV. 203, 230–36 (2009);
Richard A. Molina, An Old Accounting Standard Needs to Tie Into a New Tax Policy, 139
TAX NOTES 65 (2013); Lee A. Sheppard, Do Multinationals Abuse the Indefinite Reinvestment
Exception?, 141 TAX NOTES 255 (2013).
17. See generally JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34115, REFORM OF
U.S. INTERNATIONAL T AXATION: ALTERNATIVES 19 (2010) [hereinafter GRAVELLE, RE-
FORM] (“[I]t is likely that tax havens on balance magnify the distorting effects of defer-
ral. . .”); Jane G. Gravelle, The Corporate Income Tax: A Persistent Policy Challenge, 11 FLA.
TAX R EV. 75, 93 (2011) (“Google’s method of tax avoidance would not operate without
deferral.”); Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the System, supra note 5, at 691 (“[T]ax planning
before check-the-box still provided many opportunities for income shifting”); Martin A. Sul-
livan, The Other Problem with Cost Sharing, 139 TAX NOTES 973, 975 (2013).Fall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 7
for U.S. corporations to operate through controlled foreign subsidiaries in
low-tax countries, thus eroding the U.S. tax base.18
Accordingly, this Article will not discuss the details of creating the
multiple forms of low-taxed foreign income that bedevil the U.S. interna-
tional income tax regime. Instead, we use a simplified example in which a
foreign country offers an investment incentive in the form of an income
tax holiday that creates a zero foreign income tax rate. Thus, the Article
will focus on the interaction of deferral and cross-crediting with aggressive
transfer pricing and on the assertion that global formulary apportionment,
despite its flaws, would be a superior response in comparison to the arm’s-
length standard. This approach allows us to look beyond tax base erosion
techniques and consider the more fundamental aspects of income shifting
that depletes the domestic tax base and provides a distortive incentive to
shift employment and real investment away from the United States, mat-
ters that are and should be of serious concern to U.S. policy makers.
Our analysis emphasizes the territorial feature of formulary appor-
tionment. This is important because it highlights that the incentives under
a formulary apportionment regime to shift employment and real economic
activity abroad are at least as powerful as similar incentives under an ex-
plicit territorial system. If the debate regarding formulary apportionment
is superficially limited to comparing its costs with the costs that the arm’s-
length approach imposes in order to achieve a limited restraint on income
shifting, then the case for formulary apportionment is artificially in-
flated.19 When, however, formulary apportionment is understood as a ver-
sion of territoriality, then the debate properly includes a comparison of the
locational distortion and other disadvantages of formulary apportionment
in relation to the arm’s-length method. Moreover, the case for formulary
apportionment deteriorates further when compared with the alternative of
employing the arm’s-length method within a properly designed worldwide
system. Thus, because neither the arm’s-length approach nor formulary
apportionment overcomes the negative effects of deferral and cross-credit-
ing in the current U.S. international income tax system, the debate regard-
ing the arm’s-length versus formulary apportionment approaches to
aggressive transfer pricing largely amounts to an argument about which
shade of lipstick to put on a pig.
While we support the goal of an efficient worldwide allocation of capi-
tal, it is important to recognize that international tax system features that
distort investment decisions are almost always subsidies of some kind.
18. See Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, supra note 2, at 373; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse
than Exemption, supra note 12, at 96–104. This is particularly so where the U.S. resident’s
foreign subsidiary engages in high-value manufacturing or owns high-value foreign
intangibles.
19. But see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Exploring the Contours of a
Proposed U.S. Exemption (Territorial) Tax System, 109 TAX N OTES 1557, 1560–68 (2005)
(explaining that although territorial systems are simpler than worldwide systems with a for-
eign tax credit, they are significantly complex when designed to incorporate sound policy
principles).8 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
Consequently, our overall approach is driven by an aversion to the tax
system being used to subsidize distorted behavior20 without an objective
cost-benefit analysis being undertaken to determine the efficacy of the
subsidy.21 This is particularly problematic in light of structural budget defi-
cits and important competing security/national defense and social program
demands on an inadequate U.S. revenue base.22
Irrespective of whether one concludes that, despite its considerable
imperfections, global formulary apportionment would or would not be su-
perior to the current flawed U.S. system, we conclude that formulary ap-
portionment would be decidedly inferior to a U.S. international income
tax regime that is transformed into a real worldwide system.23 Among
20. See also Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the System, supra note 5, at 681–82 (“We take
a broad view of efficiency to include the losses from income shifting attributable to tax plan-
ning costs and the distortions in investment incentives.”). See generally J. Clifton Fleming, Jr.
& Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International Dimen-
sion, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 528–61 (2008) [hereinafter Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating].
21. See Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating, supra note 20. Experts in the field have
expressed the view that it is beyond the current state of knowledge to be able to estimate
behavioral elasticities and develop macroeconomic models to support with the level of confi-
dence appropriate for policy prescription a neutrality principle-based approach for taxing
foreign business income. See IMF, SPILLOVERS, supra note 6, at 72-73 (capital export neutral-
ity, capital import neutrality, and capital ownership neutrality “provide only limited guidance
. . . and indeed are rarely invoked in policy discussions”); Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grub-
ert, Corporate Taxes in the World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border In-
come, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS 319, 320 (John
W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008) (various neutrality principles are based on
very simple models that do not reflect adequately the complexities of actual economic activ-
ity to serve as a reliable guide for policy). We recognize that it may be possible in theory to
design a targeted subsidy to address a particular market defect (including on a distributional-
neutral basis). See generally LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECO-
NOMICS (2008). However, no consensus exists that providing a reduced level of residence
country tax on foreign income unambiguously enhances efficiency or welfare (including
under alternative definitions). Similarly, no consensus exists regarding the distributional ef-
fects of such subsidies. We have in prior writings also explained why we believe that U.S.
international tax policy must take account of other considerations in addition to efficiency
that contribute to the welfare of U.S. residents and therefore bear on such policy. See J.
Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International Taxation:
The Ability-To-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299 (2001) [herein-
after Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness in International Taxation]; see also Stephen E. Shay,
Commentary on Ownership Neutrality and Practical Complications, 62 TAX L. REV. 317,
330–331 (2009).
22. See generally J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Design-
ing a U.S. Exemption System for Foreign Income When the Treasury is Empty,13 FLA. TAX
REV. 397, 406–12 (2012) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing].
23. Some critics of a real worldwide system (i.e., a regime that applies the U.S. income
tax to foreign-source income as it is earned but that allows a credit for any foreign tax on that
income up to the level of the U.S. tax) characterize such a system as “commonly justified by
appeal to the principle of capital export neutrality.” Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James
R. Hines, Jr., Domestic Effects of the Foreign Activities of US Multinationals, 1 AM. ECON. J.:
ECON. POLICY 181, 201 (2009). Although we conclude that of the various economic theories
for structuring the taxation of international income, capital export neutrality comes closest to
prescribing the correct result, we also conclude that it is not completely satisfactory, particu-
larly because it supports an unlimited foreign tax credit. See also IMF, SPILLOVERS, supraFall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 9
other things, a real worldwide system would make aggressive transfer pric-
ing largely irrelevant with respect to the taxation of U.S. MNEs because
the income of these enterprises would bear a current U.S. residual tax
even if shifted to a low-tax or zero-tax foreign country. Transfer pricing
would, of course, remain an issue with respect to foreign MNEs that earn
U.S.-source income. In that regard, we make preliminary suggestions in
this Article for strengthening the U.S. arm’s-length transfer pricing re-
gime, and in future work we will propose stronger barriers against earn-
ings stripping. These matters, however, are largely outside the scope of
this Article, which focuses on the behavior of U.S. MNEs.
If adoption of a real worldwide system is not possible, the second best
approach would be to create a new Subpart F category for low-taxed for-
eign income, but with no exceptions for same-country income and manu-
facturing income. This approach would also create a new foreign tax
limitation category for such low-taxed foreign income. In our view, formu-
lary apportionment is at best a “Plan C.”
We see little chance for bilateral or multilateral agreements regarding
the elements of a formulary apportionment regime.24 Accordingly, this
Article assumes that unilateral action by the United States likely would be
the only practical approach. However, for the reasons given in Section V,
below,25 this is not necessarily an insurmountable problem.
I. CREATING AND INFLATING THE VALUE OF LOW- AND ZERO-TAXED
FOREIGN INCOME UNDER THE PRESENT U.S. SYSTEM
A country’s method for mitigating international double taxation sig-
nificantly affects the degree to which aggressive transfer pricing is used as
a planning tool to create low-taxed foreign income. Speaking broadly,
countries have two options for dealing with the fact that their residents
earn business income across international borders and, therefore, are inev-
itably faced with potential international double taxation—i.e., taxation of
the same income by both the residence country and the foreign country.26
note 6, at 72-73. Instead, as explained in the text below, see infra text accompanying notes
66–72, our strong preference for real worldwide taxation is primarily driven by a desire to
avoid the tax subsidies and distorted business and investment behavior that characterize
other approaches to international income taxation. Some of the distortions are illustrated
below at infra text accompanying notes 34–43.
24. See ORG. FOR E CON. COOP. & DEV., ACTION P LAN FOR B ASE E ROSION AND
PROFIT SHARING 14, 20 (2013) [hereinafter OECD ACTION PLAN]; Avi-Yonah, Clausing &
Durst, supra note 2, at 510; Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of
Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA. TAX REV. 79, 159 (2008); Kleinbard, Les-
sons, supra note 8, at 145 n.162; Susan C. Morse, Revisiting Global Formulary Apportion-
ment, 29 VA. TAX R EV. 593, 624–25 (2010) [hereinafter Morse, Revisiting]; Sheppard,
Twilight, supra note 2, at 8.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 135–141.
26. Under customary international law, residence countries are obligated to alleviate
international double taxation. See AM. LAW INST., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 413, cmt.a (1986); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL ART. 23A,10 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
Under the first option, countries can tax residents on their worldwide in-
comes (i.e., the sum of their domestic and foreign incomes), while allowing
a credit for foreign tax imposed on the foreign portion of worldwide in-
come.27 We have explained in earlier work that although the United States
purports to employ this type of system, the deferral,28 cross-crediting,29
and other features of the U.S. system make it so badly flawed that it is not
a true worldwide regime. Instead, it is a de facto, poorly designed, and
elective quasi-territorial system30 that, like actual territorial systems, en-
courages U.S. MNEs31 to locate their operations in low-tax foreign coun-
tries.32 Moreover, the U.S. regime is more complicated than a well-
designed territorial system and it encourages the accumulation of foreign
profits in foreign subsidiaries.33
This regrettable approach to taxing the international income of U.S.
residents, however, could be reformed into a real worldwide regime, prin-
23B (2012) [hereinafter OECD, MODEL T AX C ONVENTION]; UNITED N ATIONS, MODEL
DOUBLE T AXATION C ONVENTION B ETWEEN D EVELOPED AND D EVELOPING C OUNTRIES
ART. 23A, 23B (2011) [hereinafter UN, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION]. Regard-
ing the inevitability of international double taxation, see Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing,
supra note 22, at 401–02.
27. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 23.
28. See supra note 12.
29. See supra note 13.
30. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 12; Kleinbard,
Stateless Income, supra note 4, at 715–26. A country operating a territorial system taxes only
income that is considered allocable to its geographical territory. Territorial systems are also
referred to as exemption systems because they confer an exemption on foreign income. See,
e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 17–18, 22–23.
31. For purposes of this Article, a U.S. MNE is an affiliated corporate group in which
the controlling corporation is a U.S. person as defined in Section 7701(a)(30). For an exam-
ple, see infra text accompanying notes 35–42.
32. See Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, supra note 2, at 373; Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the
System, supra note 5, at 688 (“[t]his is true even in the absence of check-the-box”); David S.
Miller, How U.S. Tax Law Encourages Investment Through Tax Havens, 131 TAX NOTES 167
(2011) [hereinafter Miller, Investment Through Tax Havens]; see also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr.,
Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Perspectives on the Worldwide vs. Territorial Taxation
Debate, 125 TAX NOTES 1079, 1084–86 (2009) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspec-
tives]; sources cited supra note 16 (discussing financial reporting rules that have the same
incentive effect). The limitations on deferral in Subpart F are outdated and have only a very
limited effect in preventing this result. See, e.g., Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than Exemp-
tion, supra note 12, at 90–93; Michael C. Durst, Congress: Fix Transfer Pricing and Protect
U.S. Competitiveness, 128 TAX NOTES 401, 403 (2010) [hereinafter Durst, Fix Transfer Pric-
ing] (concluding that the large amounts of income being shifted “to low- and zero-tax coun-
tries shows that in reality, Subpart F has only limited effect”).
33. See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND STRUC-
TURAL ANALYSES OF ALTERNATIVE U.S. TAX POLICIES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
14–19 (2008) [hereinafter JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES]; U.S. TREASURY
DEP’T, APPROACHES TO I MPROVE C OMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS T AX S YSTEM
FOR THE 21ST C ENTURY 57–58 (2007) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, APPROACHES]. See
generally Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than Exemption, supra note 12. Regarding the
efficiency cost of delaying repatriation, see Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the System, supra
note 5, at 683–85.Fall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 11
cipally by eliminating deferral and substantially restricting cross-crediting.
Reform of this kind is feasible if the political will exists.34 Nevertheless,
the United States continues to operate its de facto, elective, quasi-territo-
rial system. As a result, the United States effectively has chosen to en-
courage and reward the creation of low- and zero-taxed foreign-source
income through aggressive transfer pricing. The following example illus-
trates this observation.
Example 1: DP is a U.S. corporation that is wholly owned by U.S.
residents. DP has invented a consumer product called the Gizmo
that is expected to be a smash hit in the U.S. market and DP must
now build a manufacturing facility. Assume that if the factory is
built in the United States, the manufacturing operation (including
use of the related patents) will produce a 15 percent before-tax
rate of return but if built in Lowtaxia, the before-tax rate of return
from the operation will be only 13 percent because of various in-
frastructure, workforce, and market distance considerations.
However, Lowtaxia is offering a zero rate tax holiday for the ex-
pected life of the factory.
In this situation, DP would consider forming FS, a wholly
owned Lowtaxia subsidiary corporation, to build and own the new
factory. This alternative would also involve DP licensing the pat-
ents to FS. FS would then use the patents and factory to manufac-
ture Gizmos which DP would purchase for resale to U.S.
consumers. Because FS would be a foreign corporation and a sep-
arate taxpayer from DP for U.S. income tax purposes (notwith-
standing DP’s 100 percent stock ownership),35 U.S. tax on FS’s
income would be deferred until the income is repatriated by FS
paying dividends to DP or by DP selling FS stock at a price that
reflects income accumulated by FS.36 This is the so-called deferral
privilege. During the period of deferral, FS would enjoy the eco-
nomic benefit of being able to reinvest its income and the de-
ferred tax amounts at an after-tax rate of return higher than
available to DP by expanding and upgrading its Lowtaxia opera-
34. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 4, at 20–21; Jeffrey M. Kadet, U.S. Tax Reform:
Full-Inclusion Over Territorial System Compelling, 139 TAX N OTES 295 (2013); Kleinbard,
Lessons, supra note 8, at 152–66; Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay,
Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Income Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52
SMU L. Rev. 455 (1999) [hereinafter Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious]; ABA Tax’n
Sec., Report, supra note 8, at 731–35; Thompson, supra note 2.
35. See Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). This has been de-
scribed as “the fantastic [notion] that . . . a wholly owned subsidiary has a mind of its own
with which to negotiate ‘arm’s-length’ contractual terms with its parent.” Kleinbard, Stateless
Income, supra note 4, at 709; see also, Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 501.
36. Because FS’s income would be derived from manufacturing activity in its country
of incorporation, it would not result in Subpart F inclusions by DP. See I.R.C. §§ 951(a),
954(a), (d) (2014); Treas. Reg. § 1.954–3(a)(4). This is one of the major defects of current law
Subpart F that undermine its ability to prevent income shifting and base erosion.12 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
tions. If the deferral period were sufficiently long, this economic
benefit would largely offset the U.S. residual tax on income that is
ultimately repatriated to DP.37 If DP could not wait long enough
for the benefits of deferral, it could use credits for foreign tax in
excess of U.S. tax on other foreign-source income to eliminate
U.S. tax on dividends from FS—a process known as cross-
crediting.38
Either way, the income from the Gizmo manufacturing activ-
ity effectively would be removed from the U.S. tax base and this
income would also be free of Lowtaxia tax because of the tax holi-
day. Thus, the after-tax return from the Lowtaxia factory invest-
ment would approach the before-tax return—13 percent.39 By
contrast, if the new factory were built in the United States, then
even if the U.S. corporate tax rate were cut to 25 percent,40 the
U.S. tax would reduce the factory’s 15 percent before-tax rate of
return to 11.25 percent after-tax.41 Thus, because of the significant
tax benefits provided by deferral and cross-crediting under the
current U.S. tax law, DP would have a powerful incentive to build
the new factory and locate the related jobs in Lowtaxia even
37. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than Exemption, supra note 12, at 85–104;
Durst, Fix Transfer Pricing, supra note 32 at 402–03. The standard assumptions are equal pre-
tax rates of return on investments in the United States and abroad, continued ability to rein-
vest savings, and unchanging tax rates. Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing, supra note 22, at
409 n.36; see Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income of Foreign Subsidiaries: A Review of the Basic
Analytics, 145 TAX NOTES 321, 322, 325 (2014) (concluding that the advantage of deferral
comes from the application of the lower tax rate abroad, not from delaying the U.S. tax on
foreign-source income). Under this analysis, tax exemption of foreign income always yields a
greater benefit than deferral. Warren, supra, at 323. The standard assumptions described
above do not take into account expectations of tax holiday rates on repatriated earnings and
financial accounting rules that treat permanently reinvested deferred earnings as exempt
from U.S. residual tax, which may explain in part the high level of retained offshore earnings.
38. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 4, at 7–9; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than
Exemption, supra note 12, at 132–37.
39. See JOINT C OMM. ON T AX’N, ALTERNATIVE P OLICIES, supra note 33, at 16 n.41
(“[A]s deferral increases, the break even return on a deferred offshore investment declines
and approaches the rate of return on the foreign investment net of the foreign host county
tax”); see also GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 485–86; Fleming, Peroni &
Shay, Worse Than Exemption, supra note 12, at 96–104. The U.S. residual tax on repatriation
is not eliminated under deferral, as it is under an exemption system, though its effective
burden can be materially reduced.
40. A prominent tax reform proposal by Representative Dave Camp would reduce the
top corporate income tax rate to 25%. See Marie Sapirie & Meg Shreve, Camp Proposes
Switch to Territorial System, 133 TAX N OTES 512 (2011). In addition, an alliance of 42 of
America’s largest corporations is lobbying for a 25% ceiling on the corporate income tax
rate. See Martin A. Sullivan, New Corporate Coalition Accepts That Reform Won’t Be Pain-
less, 139 TAX NOTES 1462 (2013).
41. 15% × (1 − .25) = 11.25%.Fall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 13
though the U.S. factory would be the economically superior
investment.42
The features of U.S. income tax law that would drive DP’s decision—
deferral and cross-crediting—are generally regarded as operating inef-
ficiently in this scenario because they have influenced DP to choose the
economically inferior location alternative.43 From that standpoint, deferral
and cross-crediting combine to create an ugly pig. If, however, there were
no restrictions on income shifting, DP could use aggressive transfer pricing
to put the pig on steroids. Specifically, DP could license the related patents
42. See JOINT C OMM., INCOME S HIFTING, supra note 8, at 5 (“Deferred taxation of
active foreign earnings provides an incentive for U.S.–based multinational corporations to
earn income abroad if that income is attributable to an active business in a lower-tax foreign
jurisdiction.”); Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 4, at 769 (“Firms also may ignore U.S.
investment opportunities that on a pre-tax basis would be preferred.”).
43. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 4, at 2; JOINT C OMM. ON T AX’N, ALTERNATIVE
POLICIES, supra note 33, at 10, 15; see also Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the System, supra note
5, at 675 (concluding that “aggressive tax planning distorts investment decisions by magnify-
ing the benefits of low-tax locations”); GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 486;
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 137–38 (4th ed. 2008); Fleming, Peroni
& Shay, Worse Than Exemption, supra note 12, at 85–86; Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the
Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 535–37 (2013). This might be
advantageous for the United States if DP’s production in Lowtaxia resulted in greater U.S.
employment than if the factory had been built in the United States. Some have suggested
that this is the case. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, APPROACHES, supra note 33, at 54; Angus,
Neubig, Solomon & Weinberger, supra note 5, at 62–63. Viewed objectively, the evidence is
at best inconclusive and, indeed, suggests that the offshoring of operations by U.S. multina-
tional corporations has served to increase foreign employment. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N,
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 33, at 20 (“There is no definitive conclusion about the
effect of outbound investment on U.S. employment”); Grubert, Foreign Taxes, supra note 4,
at 278 (concluding that “[t]he positive effects implied by the ‘low tax burdens on foreign
income are good for domestic investment’ argument and the negative effects implied by the
‘export of jobs’ argument seem to cancel”); see also Domestic-Based Multinationals Hiring
Overseas, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2013, at A2; Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Multinationals Cut U.S.
Jobs While Expanding Abroad, 128 TAX NOTES 1102 (2010); Scott Thurm, U.S. Firms Add
Jobs But Mostly Overseas, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2012, at B1.
With respect to the argument that it is worthwhile to use tax benefits to attract corpo-
rate headquarters and their alleged spillover benefits to the United States, recent work by
Professor Clausing concludes that “it is ideal to target policy goals as directly as possible, and
it is unlikely that encouraging multinational firm headquarters per se is the most efficient
way to encourage their associated positive external effects.” Kimberly A. Clausing, Should
Tax Policy Target Multinational Firm Headquarters?, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 741, 761 (2010).
It has been suggested that if DP builds the factory in Lowtaxia, a commensurate amount
of foreign capital will flow into the United States and there will be no U.S. disadvantage from
DP’s offshoring. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Old Rules and New Realities:
Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 937, 956 (2004). It is, however, far
from clear that this would happen and even if it did, there is no compelling reason for the
United States to effectively subsidize DP’s foreign factory by operating an international tax
system that imposes a zero U.S. tax on the factory’s profits. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay,
Perspectives, supra note 32, at 1087–91; see also Mitchell A. Kane, Milking Versus Parking:
Transfer Pricing and CFC Rules under the Code, 66 TAX L. REV. 487, 493 (2013) (concluding
that full rejection of the hypothesis that foreign direct investment reduces domestic invest-
ment has not been proven empirically).14 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
to FS for a zero royalty and purchase finished Gizmos from FS at a price
equal to the price at which DP will sell the Gizmos to U.S. consumers in
the U.S. market. By employing this approach, DP would report zero in-
come from the patents and zero profit on resale of Gizmos to U.S. con-
sumers.44 Conversely, the portion of the DP-FS MNE’s consolidated
Gizmo business profits that would be realized by FS and thereby benefit
from the deferral and cross-crediting features of the U.S. income tax sys-
tem would balloon to 100 percent.45
The principal answer of the United States to these transfer pricing
strategies has been the so-called arm’s-length transfer pricing rules.46 In
the above situation, the U.S. transfer pricing rules will increase DP’s roy-
alty income and resale profits from zero to something substantially more
by taxing DP as if it had (1) received arm’s-length (i.e., market rate) royal-
ties from FS for the use of the patents47 and (2) paid FS a price for the
Gizmos that was limited to an arm’s-length (i.e., fair market value)
amount.48 Thus, DP will be deemed to earn a taxable profit on the resale
of the Gizmos to U.S. consumers. So far as the U.S. tax system is con-
44. See Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, supra note 2, at 373 (“For example, firms can follow
a strategy of under- (over-) pricing intra-firm exports (imports) to (from) low tax countries”).
The aggressive international tax planning by Apple, Amazon, Google, Starbucks, and others
leaves no doubt that DP would pursue this transfer pricing strategy if there were no re-
straints. See Matthew Dalton & David D. Stewart, Apple CEO Advocates Dramatic Reform
of Corporate Tax Code, 70 TAX NOTES INT’L 866 (2013); Matthew Dalton & David D. Stew-
art, Apple Defends Tax Practices at Senate Hearing, 139 TAX NOTES 971 (2013); J. Richard
Harvey, Jr., Apple Hearing: Observations from an Expert Witness, 139 TAX N OTES 1171
(2013); Edward D. Kleinbard, Through a Latte Darkly: Starbuck’s Stateless Income Planning,
139 TAX NOTES 1515 (2013); Kristen A. Parillo, HMRC Targeting Amazon’s U.K. Opera-
tions, 66 TAX N OTES I NT’L 238 (2012); Jeremy Scott, Apple Pushes Tax Avoidance to the
Limit, 139 TAX NOTES 965 (2013); HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS,
TAX AVOIDANCE – GOOGLE, 2013 H.C. 112 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parli
ament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpubacc/112/112.pdf. See also Amy S. Elliott, Tech Com-
panies Defend International Tax Structures, 140 TAX NOTES 1530 (2013) (quoting tax director
of Adobe Systems, Inc. as stating that “Tax is a cost, like everything else, that we’d like to
minimize so that we can have more earnings to invest in the business.”); David D. Stewart,
The Fight Against Tax Avoidance and the Uncertainty of Morality, 72 TAX NOTES INT’L 99
(2013) (discussing the problems of using vague moral pronouncements to restrain income
shifting).
45. Subpart F (I.R.C. §§ 951–964 (2014)) would not negate this conclusion. Subpart F
would not apply to FS’s income because that income would be entirely the product of FS
selling goods that it had manufactured in its country of incorporation. See I.R.C. § 954 (2014);
Treas. Reg. § 1.954–3(a)(4).
46. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482–1(a)(1), (b); see also OECD ACTION PLAN, supra note 24,
at 19 (describing the transfer pricing rules that are employed by all OECD members and
other countries as “based on the arm’s-length principle”).
47. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482–4. However, the regulations provide alternative methods
for calculating royalties that use cost sharing and profit split formulas in place of evidence
from comparable transactions. See e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at
1045–68.
48. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482–3.Fall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 15
cerned, the total profits of the Gizmo business will not increase,49 but the
division of those profits between DP and FS will change so that a material
portion of the DP-FS MNE’s overall income is restored to the U.S. corpo-
rate tax base.50 Note, however, that although there is a reduction in the
portion of the group income that remains in FS, that portion continues to
benefit from deferral and cross-crediting, which could be material if FS
engages in high-value manufacturing.51 Thus, those two features of the
U.S. international tax system will continue to induce DP to have FS build
and own the factory in Lowtaxia.
Stated differently, effective limitations on aggressive transfer pricing
can limit the rewards available to U.S. resident corporations that locate
operations and intangibles in low-tax foreign countries to arm’s-length
amounts, but those rewards will persist as long as deferral and substantial
cross-crediting opportunities remain part of the system and there are juris-
dictions with lower taxes than the United States. Nonetheless, the ability
of U.S. corporations to inflate those rewards through aggressive transfer
pricing is an enormously distortive element in the U.S. system that im-
poses a high cost on the Treasury and that calls for the imposition of re-
straints. The U.S. response to aggressive transfer pricing, of course, has
been the arm’s-length approach, and many other countries around the
world have adopted that approach as well.
Various leading commentators, however, disparage the arm’s-length
approach to policing the aggressive strategy employed by DP in the pre-
ceding example. This literature52 can be boiled down to the following five
criticisms. First, the arm’s-length approach is so fact and context specific
that it cannot be effectively administered by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) or complied with by taxpayers.53 Second, it creates large system-
gaming scenarios in which the IRS is outmatched by multinational corpo-
rations that have access to more relevant information and greater profes-
49. FS will treat the deemed royalty payments as a business expense and will also
reduce its gross sales revenue to reflect that it was deemed to sell Gizmos to DP at a lower
price than the price actually charged.
50. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2014) (providing that “gross income means all income from
whatever source derived”).
51. See H. David Rosenbloom, Why Not Des Moines? A Fresh Entry Into the Subpart
F Debate, 102 TAX NOTES 274, 275 (2004) [hereinafter Rosenbloom, Why Not Des Moines?]
(“Whatever the transfer pricing rules and however talented those charged with enforcing
them, there is a slice of income that will properly reside in the [foreign] base company.”); see
also Kane, supra note 43, at 488–89 (contrasting role of transfer pricing rules to police pricing
manipulation with role of CFC rules in effectuating international tax base division).
52. See e.g., Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 4, at 733 n.71; Joann M. Weiner,
Redirecting the Debate on Formulary Apportionment, 115 TAX NOTES 1164, 1165 (2007).
53. See Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, supra note 2, at 376–77; Brauner, supra note 24, at
169; Durst, Fix Transfer Pricing, supra note 32, at 402–03; Lebowitz, supra note 6, at 587–88;
Sheppard, Twilight, supra note 2, at 12 (“[T]he United States cuts deals with multinationals
approving their transfer prices. These deals, called advance pricing agreements, are an admis-
sion that transfer pricing cannot be enforced.”); see also Richard T. Ainsworth & Andrew B.
Shact, Transfer Pricing: Data Dumps and Comparability—Studies from the U.S., U.K., Ca-
nada, and Australia, 65 TAX NOTES INT’L 299 (2012).16 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
sional resources.54 Third, it produces controversies that can be resolved
only at great expense to both the taxpayer and the government.55 Fourth,
it ignores the fact that integrated corporate groups produce efficiencies
and savings that are unavailable to independent parties dealing at arm’s
length.56 Fifth, it relies heavily on data from comparable transactions even
though such data may be unavailable, often because the data belongs to
competitors or the transactions involve intangible property that qualifies
for legal protection precisely because it is sufficiently different from in-
tangibles owned by competitors.57 Thus, the current interest in finding a
substitute for the arm’s-length approach is perfectly understandable.
II. EXPLICIT TERRITORIALITY
An explicit territorial or exemption system is the second option58 ac-
cepted by the nations of the world for ameliorating double taxation of
54. See Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, supra note 2, at 377, 379; Durst, Fix Transfer Pricing,
supra note 32, at 403; Charles I. Kingson, Can a Piece of Paper Earn Billions?, 71 TAX NOTES
INT’L 243–44 (2013). Stated differently, there are substantial information and professional
resource asymmetries between the government and taxpayers with respect to transfer pricing
issues. See Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the “Unsourceable”: The Cost Sharing Regulations and
the Sourcing of Affiliated Intangible-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631, 647 (2007).
55. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 718 n.1; Avi-Yonah & Ben-
shalom, supra note 2, at 377; Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 183–84.
56. See Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, supra note 2, at 378–79; Avi-Yonah, Clausing &
Durst, supra note 2, at 501; Benshalom, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 431; Brauner, supra note
24, at 168–69; Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 185; Rosenbloom, An-
gels on a Pin, supra note 6, at 526; Sheppard, Transfer Pricing, supra note 5, at 471.
57. See JOINT C OMM., INCOME S HIFTING, supra note 8, at 110; Avi-Yonah & Ben-
shalom, supra note 2, at 377; Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 500; Brauner,
supra note 24, at 169; Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 4, at 734; Lebowitz, supra note
6, at 587; Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 183; Rosenbloom, Angels on
a Pin, supra note 6, at 525.
58. A third approach exists in theory. A country can tax its residents on their world-
wide incomes without a credit for foreign taxes and, instead, allow its residents to treat for-
eign tax payments as deductible expenses in calculating their residence country tax liability.
This approach is largely ineffective in alleviating international double taxation and is little
used. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 23–24. Moreover, allowing only a
deduction for foreign income taxes would conflict with the obligations in U.S. income tax
treaties with countries in which most U.S. foreign direct investment is located to allow a
foreign tax credit to mitigate double taxation. Nevertheless, Professors Clausing and Shaviro
have suggested that the United States should replace its foreign tax credit with a combination
of a foreign tax deduction and a reduced U.S. tax rate on foreign income that is set at a level
just low enough to mitigate the double taxation that would otherwise result. See Kimberly
Clausing & Daniel Shaviro, A Burden-Neutral Shift from Foreign Tax Creditability to Deduct-
ibility?, 64 TAX L. REV. 431 (2011); see also DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNA-
TIONAL TAXATION (2014); Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Foreign Tax Creditability, 63 NAT’L
TAX J. 709 (2010). Adequate consideration of this suggestion would require an extensive
analysis well outside the focus of this Article. Consequently, we limit ourselves to observing
that in the existing world of disparate foreign tax rates and tax bases, it seems impossible to
find a U.S. tax rate generally applicable to foreign income that would satisfactorily address
the double tax problem resulting from replacing the U.S. foreign tax credit with a foreign tax
deduction. See also Stephen E. Shay, Theory, Complications, and Policy: Daniel Shaviro’sFall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 17
their residents’ cross-border income. Under this approach, a country taxes
domestic income and expressly exempts foreign business income. There
are two types of explicit territorial systems. The first, a traditional territo-
rial system, gives resident corporations explicit tax exemptions both for
dividends paid by foreign subsidiaries out of foreign business income and
for foreign business income earned by directly owned foreign branches.59
In terms of the present discussion, the bottom-line difference between this
approach and the current U.S. international income tax system is largely
cosmetic. The current U.S. system creates systemic value for low- and
zero-taxed foreign subsidiary business income by relying on deferral and
cross-crediting to indirectly offset the U.S. residual tax on that income. By
contrast, a traditional exemption system creates value by employing an
explicit exemption to directly reduce the U.S. residual tax. If, under the
current U.S. system, the period of deferral is long enough or the cross-
crediting is extensive enough, the incentive effects of the two approaches
on decisions concerning where to invest and locate income are in sub-
stance similar (and, when effects of the financial accounting rules are
taken into account, virtually indistinguishable).
Traditional territorial systems employ rules that make the same dis-
tinction between domestic-source income and foreign-source income that
is required for foreign tax credit purposes in a worldwide system.60 Where
the income is generated through transactions between related corpora-
tions, traditional territorial systems also employ arm’s-length transfer pric-
ing rules to measure the respective amounts that are characterized as
domestic or foreign by the source rules.61 In this setting, the transfer pric-
ing rules are subject to all of the criticisms that were previously leveled at
them in connection with their application to the current U.S. system.62
Fixing U.S. International Taxation, JERUSALEM R EV. LEGAL S TUD. (2014). More detailed
commentary on this proposal would require a separate article.
59. OECD, MODEL T AX C ONVENTION, supra note 26, at ART. 23A; UN, MODEL
DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION, supra note 26, at ART. 23A. Traditional territorial systems
are generally limited to corporate taxpayers and active business income. See Fleming, Peroni
& Shay, Designing, supra note 22, at 427–28.
60. See BRIAN J. ARNOLD & MICHAEL J. MCINTYRE, INTERNATIONAL TAX PRIMER 35
(2d ed. 2002); HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 471 (3d ed. 2010).
61. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, PRESENT LAW AND ISSUES IN U.S. TAXA-
TION OF CROSS-BORDER INCOME 96 (2011); U.S. TREAS. DEP’T., APPROACHES, supra note
33, at 60; Sullivan, Key to Reform, supra note 4, at 1316–17. As stated by one commentator:
Transfer pricing rules do not apportion income. They decide prices in hypothetical
transactions between affiliates. Then the source rules have to act to determine
where the income was earned, the residence rules have to determine where the
earner is taxed, and if the earner is a P.E., special rules apply to decide how much
of the income the host country gets to tax. At no point in the process is the mul-
tinational group’s total worldwide taxable income discoverable.
Sheppard, Transfer Pricing, supra note 5, at 471.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 52–57.18 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
Global formulary apportionment is a second type of explicit territorial
system.63 It eliminates the need for source rules and substitutes income
apportionment for arm’s-length transfer pricing rules. Specifically, it uses a
mathematical, factor-based formula to determine the extent to which the
aggregate income of a related group of corporations is allocated among
the countries in which the group conducts its activities.64 Income allocated
to a particular country by its formula is included in that country’s domestic
tax base and all other income is effectively exempt foreign income with
respect to that country even if the income is generated by assets or activi-
ties of that country’s residents who repatriated it to that country.65 In
other words, although formulary apportionment is often treated in the
literature as a distinctly different approach to international income taxa-
tion, it is actually territoriality dressed in different clothing.
III. THE “REAL” WORLDWIDE ALTERNATIVE
A. Overview
To evaluate the two versions of territoriality, it is useful to begin by
returning to worldwide income taxation and to the facts of Example 1 in
Section I.66 Assume that DP Corporation is a U.S. tax resident by virtue of
being incorporated under the law of a U.S. state67 and its stock is wholly
owned by U.S. resident individuals. It engages in manufacturing through a
wholly owned foreign subsidiary, FS, which is a resident of a low-tax coun-
try. Thus, DP and FS constitute a U.S. MNE. We have explained in prior
work that as long as DP is owned by U.S. residents, the United States
should shun both the current U.S. international income tax system and
both forms of explicit territoriality. Instead, the worldwide income (i.e.,
U.S.-source income plus foreign-source income) of DP and FS should be
63. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 4, at 22; Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note
2, at 508; Bravenec, supra note 2, at 849; Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 8, at 149. Although
global formulary apportionment uses mathematical formulas, instead of source rules and
arm’s-length transfer pricing rules, to allocate cross-border income among countries, the end
result is indistinguishable from a territorial system. This is so because only the income allo-
cated by formula to a particular country is taxable by that country. All other income is effec-
tively exempt foreign income with respect to that country even if earned and repatriated by
its residents.
64. See Morse, Revisiting, supra note 24, at 600; see also id. at 601 (suggesting that
global formulary apportionment also eliminates the need for corporate residence rules and
source country withholding taxes); William J. Wilkins & Kenneth W. Gideon, Congress: You
Wouldn’t Like Worldwide Formula Apportionment, 135 TAX NOTES 1351, 1354 (2012) (ex-
plaining that withholding on payments between members of an MNE is inconsistent with
global formulary apportionment).
65. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 4, at 22–23; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporate and
International Tax Reform: Proposals for the Second Obama Administration (and Beyond), 40
PEPP. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2013); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Reform in the (Multi)National
Interest, Letter to the Editor, 124 TAX NOTES 389, 391 (2009) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Tax
Reform]; Durst, Statutory Proposal, supra note 7, at 1050.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 34–42.
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consolidated and subjected to a current, non-deferred U.S. income tax
with a foreign tax credit system having robust limits that seriously con-
strain cross-crediting (i.e., real worldwide taxation).68 This view is based
on the fact that worldwide, non-deferred taxation is the least distortive in
regard to the question of where to locate business investment and activ-
ity69 and is the only approach to international income taxation that is con-
sistent with the fundamental principle of ability-to-pay that underlies the
choice of income as the primary base for taxation of U.S. residents.70 Fi-
68. Unless cross-crediting is severely limited, a U.S. MNE with high-taxed, foreign-
source income can use excess foreign tax credits to eliminate U.S. residual tax on low-taxed,
foreign-source income, thus creating an incentive to earn income in, and shift income to, low-
tax foreign countries. See Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the System, supra note 5, at 682, 694.
69. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 32, at 1084–85; Kadet, supra
note 34, at 297; Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 8, at 153; Daniel E. Kwak, America’s Refusal
to “Race to the Bottom”: Worldwide vs. Territorial Taxation, 65 TAX NOTES INT’L 387, 390
(2012); Thompson, supra note 2, at 576; see also Clemons, Cook & Kinney, supra note 16, at
98 (explaining that worldwide, non-deferred taxation also prevents financial reporting rules
from creating a lockout effect).
70. This point holds true even when the taxpayer is a U.S. C corporation. This is so
because the corporate income tax (see I.R.C. § 11 (2014)) is best rationalized as a surrogate
levy on shareholder income. It is true that several benefit-based rationales have been ad-
vanced to support the existence of a separate tax on corporate income. See, e.g., AM. LAW
INST., TAXATION OF P RIVATE B USINESS E NTERPRISES 51–54 (1999) [hereinafter ALI, PRI-
VATE E NTERPRISES] (acknowledging argument that separate corporate tax is justified as a
charge for the benefit of limited shareholder liability, but finding the argument unpersua-
sive); Calvin H. Johnson, Replace the Corporate Tax with a Market Capitalization Tax, 117
TAX NOTES 1082 (2007) (arguing that separate corporate tax for publicly traded corporations
is justified as a tax on the liquidity benefit of access to public securities markets); Rebecca S.
Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
965, 994 (1988–89) (same). But see Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corpo-
rate Expatriations: The Tensions Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multina-
tional Corporations, 24 VA. TAX R EV. 475 (2005) (expressing doubts that the benefits of
incorporating in the United States justify the worldwide taxation of corporate income). The
separate corporate income tax also has been rationalized as a device for regulating corporate
behavior; see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1254 (2004), as a charge for the burdens placed on
society by corporate activities; see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Reform in the (Multi)National
Interest, Letter to the Editor, 124 TAX NOTES 389 (2009), and as a tax on economic rents
earned by firms operating in corporate form, see MARK P. KEIGHTLY & MOLLY F. SHER-
LOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42726, THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX SYSTEM: OVERVIEW
AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 15 (2012). In our judgment, however, none of these rationales
justifies a tax on corporate net income as great as the present 35% top Section 11 rate, or
even the 25% top rate proposed by reformers. See, e.g., ALI, PRIVATE ENTERPRISES, supra,
at 60 (“[T]here is no indication that the amount of the tax properly reflects the value of the
benefit.”); Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the System, supra note 5, at 707 (“The corporate tax is
not generally characterized as a benefit tax.”); KEIGHTLY & SHERLOCK, supra, at 15 (“[T]he
corporate tax as currently applied is not a tax on pure profits or economic rents.”); Omri
Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C.L. REV. 1613, 1659 (2013) (“[I]t probably
makes little sense to argue that the current purpose of corporate taxes in the United States is
to tax the benefits of incorporation. Under the ‘check the box’ regulations, the U.S. is explic-
itly willing to grant such benefits without charging anything for them.”). The only persuasive
justification we can find for a separate C corporation net income tax with a top rate of 35%,
or even 25%, is that the tax serves as a crude surrogate levy on shareholders that limits the
advantage of differences between the Section 1 individual rates and the Section 11 rates, see20 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
nally, robust current, non-deferred, worldwide taxation causes the strategy
of using aggressive transfer pricing to shift income from U.S. corporations
to low-taxed foreign subsidiaries to become largely irrelevant because the
shifted income bears a robust current U.S. tax. In that setting, the policing
of transfer pricing would be a far less significant issue.
In contrast to worldwide taxation, both forms of territorial regime
would limit the United States to taxing only DP’s U.S income (whether
determined under an arm’s-length or formulary approach). Thus, either
form of territorial system would conflict with the ability-to-pay norm be-
cause it would not take the full income of U.S. resident taxpayers into
account.71 In addition, such a regime would be non-neutral with respect to
the business location decision because the exemption of foreign business
income from U.S. tax would encourage U.S. residents to locate their oper-
ations in low-taxed foreign countries so that U.S. tax would be avoided.72
JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32449, COR-
PORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4–5 (2011), and that prevents C corporations
from being used as tax deferral devices that create time value of money benefits for taxpayers
who can earn income through those corporations instead of directly (i.e., stock investors vs.
wage earners). See J.D.R. ADAMS & J. WHALLEY, THE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF MUL-
TINATIONAL E NTERPRISES IN D EVELOPED C OUNTRIES 8 (1977); KEIGHTLY & SHERLOCK,
supra, at 15; AM. LAW INST., INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME
TAXES 94 (1993); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Amir C. Chenchinski, The Case for Dividend
Deduction, 65 TAX LAW. 3, 7 (2011); Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 8, at 138–39, 159–60; see
also David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: Theory
and Doctrine in the Corporate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 215, 217 (2007) (“If we imposed only an
individual-level income tax with the realization requirement, individuals could park assets in
shell corporations and avoid taxes on capital income. Firm-level taxes, whether collected at
the firm level or calculated at the firm level and passed through to owners, can be seen as a
necessary back-up to individual-level income taxes that rely on realization.”). Because the
Section 11 tax on C corporations is best explained as a substitute for a current shareholder
tax, the base of the Section 11 tax should be consistent with the same ability-to-pay principle
that applies at the shareholder level—i.e., it should include all of the taxpayer’s foreign-
source income. Real worldwide taxation achieves this end; both forms of territorial taxation
fail to do so.
71. The ability-to-pay principle, which underlies the choice of income as the tax base,
requires that 100% of a taxpayer’s income, both domestic-source and foreign-source, be
taken into account for purposes of allocating the income tax burden. See Fleming, Peroni &
Shay, Fairness in International Taxation, supra note 21; see also AJAY K. MEHROTA, MAKING
THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE 8–15 (2013) (tracing the rise of the ability-to-pay
concept as a fundamental principle of taxation in the United States).
72. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 4, at 22; IMF, SPILLOVERS, supra note 6, at 38; see
also Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the System, supra note 5, at 682 (stating that “incentives to
shift income . . . expand under dividend exemption because of the elimination of the repatria-
tion tax”); Kadet, supra note 34; Kwak, supra note 69, at 393. Adoption of territorial systems
by residence countires can also have an untoward effect on source countries. See IMF, SPIL-
LOVERS, supra note 6, at 38 (“[I]ncreased sensitivity to effective tax rates in source countries
can lead to more intense competition to attract investment: tax holidays and other tax breaks
become more attractive to investors if the tax saved in source countries is no longer offset by
increased taxation in their residence country.”).Fall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 21
B. Ownership Issues
As noted above, various reasons have been advanced to justify the
unintegrated U.S. corporate income tax.73 In our judgment, however, the
only convincing rationale is that the Section 11 tax serves as a crude substi-
tute for a current tax on the shareholders74 of U.S. C corporations that
prevents those shareholders from exploiting advantageous differences be-
tween corporate and individual tax bases and rates75 and that prevents the
shareholders from employing C corporations as tax deferral devices.76
Thus, a decision to tax the worldwide consolidated income of DP and FS
on a current, non-deferred basis is justified because all of DP’s stock is
owned by U.S. resident individuals.77 But what if U.S. ownership of DP is
substantially less than 100 percent, what if DP’s ownership of FS is sub-
stantially less than 100 percent, and what if some of the stock of DP or FS
is owned by intermediaries? These are line-drawing problems that the
United States already deals with in many instances and answers can be
crafted to determine the point at which U.S. ownership is too attenuated
to justify worldwide taxation.78
C. Residency Issues
Consider, however, the question of what if DP, although substantially
owned by U.S. residents, is incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction? In this
73. See supra text accompanying note 70.
74. We use the term “crude” because it is widely acknowledged that a portion of the
corporate income tax is borne by non-shareholders. See e.g., STAFF OF J OINT C OMM. ON
TAX’N, MODELING THE D ISTRIBUTION OF T AXES ON B USINESS I NCOME (2013); Julie Ann
Cronin, Emily Y. Lin, Laura Power, & Michael Cooper, Distributing the Corporate Income
Tax: Revised U.S. Treasury Methodology, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 239 (2013); Jennifer C. Gravelle,
Corporate Tax Incidence: Review of General Equilibrium Estimates and Analysis, 66 NAT’L
TAX J. 185 (2013); Li Liu & Rosanne Altshuler, Measuring the Burden of Corporate Income
Tax Under Imperfect Competition, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 215 (2013). Moreover, there is no assured
relationship between corporate income tax rates and either shareholder income tax rates or
the length of time that the shareholder-level tax is deferred. However, these points support
integration of the corporate and individual income taxes, not repeal of the corporate income
tax.
75. See GRAVELLE & HUNGERFORD, supra note 70, at 4–5.
76. See Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption,
33 VA. TAX REV. 115, 141 (2013); sources cited supra note 70.
77. This assumption is not far from reality because DP is incorporated in the United
States and, at the end of the second quarter of 2013, only about 14 percent of the equity in
U.S. corporations was owned by foreign residents. This percentage is derived from BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS GUIDE, TABLE
L. 213 CORPORATE EQUITIES, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/fof/DisplayTa
ble.aspx?t=1.213. See also Marian, supra note 70, at 1639.
78. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 957(a) (a foreign corporation is a controlled foreign corporation
for Subpart F purposes if more than 50% of the vote or value of its stock is owned by United
States shareholders), 902(a) (providing that a domestic corporation is entitled to an indirect
foreign tax credit with respect to dividends received if it owns at least 10% of the voting stock
of the foreign corporation that paid the dividends), 318 (prescribing constructive ownership
rules for situations where stock is owned by related parties and intermediaries), 958 (2014)
(same for Subpart F purposes).22 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
situation, the U.S. place of incorporation test for determining corporate
tax residency79 would treat DP as a nonresident and beyond the reach of
U.S. worldwide taxation even though the substantial ownership of DP’s
stock by U.S. residents would make DP an appropriate object of such tax-
ation. We believe this demonstrates that the United States should seri-
ously consider broadening its definition of a resident corporation to
provide that foreign corporations are U.S. tax residents if they satisfy ei-
ther a shareholder residency test or the presently controlling place of in-
corporation test.80 (Though there is an additional test related to location
of management and control, as will be explained below, we do not view
this as an effective answer to the corporate residency definitional issue.) In
addition, consideration should be given to altering the taxation of U.S.
portfolio investors in foreign equities in a manner that would make taxes a
neutral factor in the decision whether to hold a domestic or foreign equity.
The question of the relation between the taxation of foreign direct invest-
ment and foreign portfolio investment is under-analyzed, but we reserve it
for consideration in a future article.
We believe that it is feasible to base corporate tax residency on share-
holding. Information regarding shareholder identity and residence will
typically be readily available in the case of closely held corporate entities.
Some commentators, however, argue that shareholder residency is un-
workable as a test for determining the tax residence of a publicly traded
corporation because the shares of those entities frequently change
hands.81 That objection might have had greater force prior to the adoption
of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),82 but in a post-
FATCA world, the law could be developed to make it easier for publicly
traded corporations to generally know the extent to which their shares are
owned by U.S. resident stockholders.83 In any event, it is technologically
79. See I.R.C. §§ 881(a), 882(a), 7701(a)(4)–(5) (2014).
80. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4–5) (2014).
81. See Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture—Taxing International In-
come: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV.
261, 323 (2001) [hereinafter Graetz, Taxing International Income]; Daniel Shaviro, The David
R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV.
377, 415 (2011) [hereinafter Shaviro, Rising Tax-Electivity].
82. Pub. L. No. 111–147, §§ 501, 511, 124 Stat. 71, 109–110 (2010). The salient provi-
sions of FATCA are in I.R.C. §§ 1471–74, 6038 D (2014).
83. FATCA generally provides that corporations, whether U.S. or foreign, that pay
U.S.-source dividends to foreign financial institutions must either learn the resident status of
the payees for whom the foreign institutions are acting or withhold a 30% tax and remit it to
the IRS. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 276–77; see also ORGANIZATION
FOR E CONOMIC C OOPERATION AND D EVELOPMENT, STANDARD FOR A UTOMATIC E X-
CHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION 5–8 (2014) (proposing a global approach for
automatic exchange of financial account information that would require “financial institu-
tions to look through shell companies, trusts or similar arrangements”); Joshua D. Blank &
Ruth Mason, Exporting FATCA, 142 TAX N OTES 1245, 1249 (2014) (“U.S. passage of
FATCA emboldened some of our trading partners to rally behind a new standard of auto-
matic information exchange.”); Stephanie Soong Johnston, U.K. Opens Consultation on Ben-
eficial Ownership, 71 TAX NOTES INT’L 300 (2013) (describing proposal to achieve “enhancedFall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 23
feasible for U.S. and foreign public corporations to know whether a major-
ity (or another percentage) of their shares is owned by U.S. resident stock-
holders. Moreover, with regard to U.S. corporations, Federal Reserve data
indicates that 85 percent or more of the value of the shares in such entities
is owned by U.S. residents.84 Thus, even if the U.S. share ownership
benchmark for determining U.S. corporate residence were set at close to
50 percent, by vote or value, it should rarely be the case that a corporation
would change from a U.S. resident to a nonresident or vice versa because
of share trading.85 Furthermore, the risk of this happening could be ame-
liorated by providing that the percentage of share ownership by U.S. re-
sidents will be determined on the basis of an average calculated over a
three- or five-year, forward-moving period.86
Indeed, the United States moved toward a shareholder-based test for
determining corporate tax residence by adopting Section 7874, which pro-
vides that if an inversion transaction results in at least 80 percent (by vote
or value) of a foreign corporation’s stock being owned by shareholders of
the inverted U.S. corporation, the foreign corporation is a U.S. tax resi-
dent.87 As for the problem of stock that is owned by intermediates or re-
lated parties, the United States has shown that those problems can be
dealt with through indirect and constructive stock ownership rules,88 such
as those found in the U.S. controlled foreign corporation provisions,89 and
through stock ownership attribution rules found in other Internal Revenue
Code provisions.90 Finally, when a corporation’s shares are traded in U.S.
securities markets, this suggests that such shares are marketed to, and held
by, U.S. residents to a significant extent. Thus, a corporate residency test
based on share ownership could be buttressed with a rebuttable presump-
transparency of company ownership” by requiring U.K. registered companies to disclose the
beneficial owners of their shares); Stephanie Soong Johnston, OECD Unveils Global Stan-
dard on Automatic Information Exchange, 144 TAX N OTES 428 (2014) (discussing new
OECD global standard on automatic information exchange); Jeffrey Owens, Embracing Tax
Transparency, 72 TAX N OTES I NT’L 1105, 1109 (2013) (describing the active efforts of 70
nations to globalize FATCA through automatic exchange of information regarding financial
income, including dividends); Harriet Torry, Countries Sign Deal to Combat Tax Evasion,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2014, at A9 (announcing agreement among 50 countries “to collect and
exchange information on taxpayers’ assets and income outside their home country”).
Although Professor Chris Sanchirico has argued that neither Treasury data nor federal
securities law disclosures presently allow the U.S. ownership of large multinational corpora-
tions to be determined, his analysis does not take FATCA developments into account. See
Chris William Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International Tax and Ownership Na-
tionality, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2394227.
84. See supra text accompanying note 77.
85. See Marian, supra note 70, at 1639.
86. Id.
87. See I.R.C. § 7874(b) (2014); see also U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 65 (2014) (proposing to re-
place the 80 percent benchmark in Section 7874 with a greater than 50 percent test).
88. See I.R.C. § 958 (2014).
89. See I.R.C. §§ 951–965 (2014).
90. See I.R.C. §§ 318, 544, 1298(a), 1563(e) (2014).24 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
tion that foreign corporations are U.S. tax residents if their shares are reg-
ularly traded in one or more U.S. public capital markets.91 For the
foregoing reasons, we conclude that shareholder residence is a feasible ap-
proach for determining corporate tax residence.92 In addition, as noted
above, corporations formed under U.S. law are overwhelmingly owned by
U.S. resident shareholders.93 Thus, treating corporations as U.S. tax re-
sidents if they are incorporated under U.S. law effectively amounts to ap-
plying an ersatz shareholder-based residency test94 and, accordingly, we
recommend a presumption of U.S. resident classification for U.S. incorpo-
rated entities as a convenient alternative to the direct shareholder resi-
dence test discussed above.95 We also recommend that the presumption be
rebuttable by the corporation if it can demonstrate that its shares are not
predominately owned by U.S. residents. This presumption also would be
overcome on the same basis by the IRS so that it has the statutory author-
ity to deal with foreign-owned corporations formed under U.S. law for
U.S. tax-avoidance reasons.
This use of multiple corporate residence tests would, of course, in-
crease the number of corporations that fall into dual resident status with
respect to the U.S. international income tax system. However, several
other countries with large economies employ multiple corporate residency
tests without encountering unmanageable difficulties96 and the same
would likely be true with respect to the United States.
Some commentators suggest using the location of a corporation’s
place of management, defined in various ways,97 as an alternative test for
91. It might be suggested that this approach should be rejected because it could create
a bias against listing companies in the United States. See ABA Tax’n Sec., Report, supra note
8, at 753; Marian, supra note 70, at 1647. However, since substantial share ownership of a
corporation by U.S. residents would alone be sufficient to make the corporation a U.S. tax
resident under our proposal, a corporation that seeks U.S. investors would usually wind up in
U.S. resident status even if it listed its shares outside the United States. Thus, a corporation
would usually lose nothing by a U.S. listing and a residency test based on trading in U.S.
capital markets should not be a significant barrier to U.S. listings. For purposes of determin-
ing whether U.S. persons own more than 50% of a transferee foreign corporation with re-
spect to certain transfers of domestic corporation stock, Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)–3(c)(2) adopts
a presumption that persons transferring stock of the domestic corporation are U.S. persons
unless proven otherwise through ownership statements from transferors and a certification
under penalties of perjury by a corporate officer of the domestic corporation regarding the
percentage of the transferee foreign corporation owned by non-U.S. transferees. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.367(a)–3(c)(7).
92. See generally Marian, supra note 70, at 1638–42.
93. See supra text accompanying note 77.
94. See Marian, supra note 70, at 1652; see also Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 8, at
159–60.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 80–92. A corporation should not, however, be
characterized as nonresident solely because it is formed under foreign law. Doing so would
create the problematic result of corporations escaping U.S. resident status by means of for-
eign incorporation even though owned by U.S. residents.
96. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 60, at 434–36.
97. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 60, at 435–36; Marian, supra note 70, at 1625–26.Fall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 25
determining corporate residence.98 We do not recommend this approach,
however, because there does not appear to be a clear and invariable
linkage between a corporation’s place of management and the residence of
its equity owners, who are the ultimate targets of the corporate income tax
in our view. Indeed, in a world where meetings can be literally held no-
where by electronic conferencing technology, the traditional British ap-
proach of treating place of management as the location of directors’
meetings99 means that the site of a corporation’s place of management can
be indeterminate. Finally, even if place of management is given the more
substantial definition of corporate headquarters,100 this approach would
create an incentive for corporations to refrain from maintaining their
headquarters in the United States.101 Indeed, there are tax-advantaged
foreign locations where U.S. managers can be stationed without their hav-
ing to learn another language or sacrifice lifestyle comforts (for example,
Dublin, London, or Singapore).102 There is good reason not to utilize this
approach, given that the place of management test is not clearly linked to
the corporate income tax’s objective of indirectly taxing shareholders.
For these reasons, we would consider basing the U.S. corporate resi-
dence determination on alternative tests, as described above, of share-
holder residence or incorporation under U.S. law (but not incorporation
under foreign law). This would be a feasible approach that deflects the
argument that worldwide taxation is hopelessly flawed because there is no
workable and effective definition of corporate residence.103
D. Runaway Corporations
Some commentators have suggested that if the United States imple-
ments rigorous and real worldwide taxation, U.S. MNEs will conduct their
new technology and product development activities through subsidiaries
formed in low-tax offshore jurisdictions.104 If so, and if the present U.S.
deferral rule continues to apply, MNE income subject to current U.S. taxa-
98. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE
AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 179-81 (2005) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., OPTIONS TO IM-
PROVE]; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Beyond Territoriality and Deferral: The Promise of “Managed
and Controlled,” 63 TAX N OTES I NT’L 667 (2011); Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 8, at
160–61.
99. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 60, at 435.
100. See JOINT COMM., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE, supra note 98, at 180–81; Roin, Can the
Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 188.
101. See Marian, supra note 70, at 1621–22.
102. See generally Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 188–89. But see
Marian, supra note 70, at 1645–46 (arguing the contrary).
103. See Shaviro, Rising Tax-Electivity, supra note 81, at 402.
104. See Herman B. Bouma, The Tax Code and Reality: Improving the Connection, 85
TAX NOTES 811, 813 (1999); Ryan J. Donmoyer, Multinationals Beg Finance to Simplify Inter-
national Laws, 82 TAX NOTES 1539 (1999); Susan C. Morse, The Transfer Pricing Regs Need a
Good Edit, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1415, 1419–20 (2013) [hereinafter Morse, Transfer Pricing Regs];
Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition,
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tion will decline and the income growth of U.S. MNEs will occur outside
the reach of the U.S. tax system. However, this strategy would be vitiated
by adoption of either our recommendation for repeal of deferral105 or our
recommendation to treat foreign corporations as U.S. tax residents when
they are predominately owned by other U.S. tax residents.106 Either pro-
posal would result in subjecting the income of U.S. MNE foreign subsidi-
aries to current U.S. taxation, thus eliminating the tax reward for moving
new technology and product developments into such subsidiaries.107
On a related point, much has been written about how the present U.S.
international income tax regime promotes corporate inversions108—i.e.,
transactions that transform a U.S. corporation into a foreign entity that
has no Section 951(b) United States shareholders and that, therefore,
avoids current U.S. taxation of its foreign-source income because it is
neither a U.S. tax resident nor a Section 957(a) controlled foreign corpora-
tion. Section 7874 was, generally speaking, enacted to (1) treat the surviv-
ing foreign corporation as a U.S. resident when it is at least 80 percent
owned by former shareholders of the inverted U.S. corporation and the
surviving foreign corporation lacks substantial business activity in its coun-
try of incorporation and (2) treat the surviving foreign corporation as for-
eign, but impose an enhanced exit tax where there is insufficient foreign
country business activity and the historic shareholders of the inverted U.S.
corporation wind up owning less than 80 percent, but at least 60 percent,
of the surviving foreign corporation.109 Although Section 7874 signifi-
cantly reduced the attractiveness of inversion transactions as a practical
way to escape U.S. worldwide taxation,110 its percentage ownership and
business activity requirements provide avoidance pathways that are cur-
rently being used111 and that would become more attractive if our recom-
mendation for real worldwide taxation were adopted.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 68–70.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 80–95.
107. Interestingly, Professors Allen and Morse found that out of 918 U.S. headquar-
tered MNEs that conducted U.S. initial public offerings between 1997 and 2010, only about
3% were incorporated in tax havens. See Eric J. Allen & Susan C. Morse, Tax-Haven Incor-
poration for U.S.-Headquartered Firms: No Exodus Yet, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 395 (2013). One
would expect the 3% figure to be much higher if the U.S. tax system were causing new U.S.
ventures to choose foreign incorporation.
108. See generally Steven H. Goldman, Corporate Expatriation: A Case Analysis, 9 FLA.
TAX REV. 71 (2008); Kirsch, supra note 70; Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note
7, at 186 n.51; Bret Wells, What Corporate Inversions Teach About International Tax Reform,
127 TAX NOTES 1345 (2010).
109. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION
ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONGRESS 344–45 (2005).
110. See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 8, at 160–61; Lee A. Sheppard, Inversions Con-
tinue, but Are More Difficult, 141 TAX NOTES 355 (2013).
111. See Mindy Herzfeld, What’s Next in Inversion Land?, 143 TAX N OTES 1225,
1226–27 (2014); Bret Wells, Cant and the Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Inversions, 136
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However, treating foreign corporations as U.S. tax residents when
they are predominately owned by other U.S. tax residents would dramati-
cally undercut the inversion strategy if predominant stock ownership were
defined as close to 50 percent, by vote or value, of the surviving foreign
corporation. A less dramatic way of getting to the same result would be to
reduce the required stock ownership percentages in Section 7874 and to
define that provision’s substantial business activity requirement in a way
that sets a high bar.112 In other words, there are feasible ways to prevent
corporate inversions from being used to readily escape a real U.S. world-
wide taxation regime.
Of course neither our proposed change to the definition of U.S. corpo-
rate tax resident nor likely modifications to Section 7874 will prevent a
U.S. corporation from escaping U.S. worldwide taxation through acquisi-
tion by a foreign entity in which the U.S. corporation’s historic sharehold-
ers hold only minority stock ownership. In cases of that nature, it is
important to ensure that the exit tax provisions of Section 367 are appro-
priately robust,113 but that matter is outside the scope of this Article.
E. Consolidation
Finally, we consider how to consolidate the income of DP and FS.
Professor Kleinbard has advocated doing it by following existing financial
accounting rules.114 In our earlier work, we advocated doing it by treating
all entities below DP in the DP corporate group as pass-through enti-
ties.115 Mr. Cummings has suggested relying on the existing consolidated
return rules but modifying those rules to provide for automatic inclusion
of foreign subsidiaries in affiliated groups and for making consolidation
112. See Kevin M. Cunningham, The New Section 7874 Substantial Business Activity
Exception Regulations: Closing the Door, 67 TAX NOTES INT’L 961 (2012); Lindsey McPher-
son & Andrew Velarde, Democrats Disagree on Legislative Fix for Inversions, 143 TAX
NOTES 876 (2014); Martin A. Sullivan, Short-Term Inversion Fix May Be Necessary, 143 TAX
NOTES 1090 (2014). To address a recent wave of corporate expatriation reorganizations, pro-
posals to reduce the Section 7874 ownership threshold to be treated as a domestic company
to more than 50 percent have been introduced by Democrats in the U.S. Senate and U.S.
House of Representatives. See, e.g., S. 2360, The Stop Corporate Expatriation and Invest in
America’s Infrastructure Act of 2014 (introduced by Senator Levin); H.R. 4985, The Stop
Corporate Expatriation and Invest in America’s Infrastructure Act of 2014 (introduced by
Representative Van Hollen).
113. See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 8, at 161 (“[Section 367] imposes a prohibitive
‘toll charge’ on the transfer of U.S. business assets to a foreign firm in a tax-free incorpora-
tion or reorganization transaction. Those rules also apply to tax-free stock acquisitions in
which the stock of a U.S. firm is acquired by a foreign company, and U.S. shareholders con-
trol the combined enterprise.”).
114. See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 8, at 152.
115. See Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious, supra note 34, at 508–12; see also
Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enter-
prises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 77 (1993).28 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
mandatory whenever an affiliated group includes a foreign subsidiary.116
For purposes of this Article, however, we will not attempt to pinpoint the
details of how to effect the consolidation. The important point is that there
are practical ways to get it done and this issue is not an impediment to
transforming the U.S. international tax system into a real worldwide
system.
F. Complexity
We recognize that rules necessary to implement a real worldwide cor-
porate tax regime will add complexity to the income tax law. We do not,
however, regard this as a reason to abandon this reform.
First, the population of taxpayers that would have to deal with this
complexity is comparatively small. Thus, approximately 2,040,000 federal
C corporation returns were filed for 2004,117 but only 5,502 (0.27 percent)
of those returns indicated receipt of foreign income, because only that
number of returns involved a foreign tax credit claim.118 More impor-
tantly, about 80 percent of the foreign income earned that year by U.S.
multinational corporations was earned by fewer than 900 corporations.119
Second, the evidence from taxpayer behavior suggests that the burden of
complexity may be overstated. The relatively small group of taxpayers that
would be required to address the increased complexity that we are propos-
ing is highly experienced in dealing with legal intricacy and has the com-
puting and professional resources to do so. For example, they have coped
with the distinction between manufacturing and non-manufacturing in-
come required by Section 199, with the limitations on the Section 965 tem-
porary dividends-received deduction, with various look-through-rules in
the foreign tax credit and the Subpart F provisions, and with the Section
902 deemed paid credit. We are not dealing with individuals struggling at
the kitchen table with pencil and paper or with basic tax preparation
software. Accordingly, there is reason to believe that the marginal addi-
tional complexity cost is justified by the benefits in efficiency and fairness.
Finally, a real worldwide system would allow the elimination of Subpart F
and reduce the strain on other pressure points in the international tax sys-
tem, such as transfer pricing, which would have significant simplification
and cost reduction benefits for taxpayers and tax administrators.120
116. See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Consolidating Foreign Affiliates, 11 FLA. TAX REV.
143, 145, 197, 206 (2011). Professor Green generally agrees. See Green, supra note 115, at
78–79.
117. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO CHOICE OF
BUSINESS ENTITY 5 (2012).
118. See Scott Luttrell, Corporate Foreign Tax Credit, 2004,S UMMER 2008 IRS STATIS-
TICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 111 (2008).
119. See Grubert, Foreign Taxes, supra note 3, at 251; see also GRAVELLE, REFORM,
supra note 17, at 19 (“Despite increasing globalization of the U.S. economy, foreign direct
investment remains a small share of the U.S.-owned capital stock.”).
120. Grubert and Altshuler state that “Subpart F would . . . be necessary to retain the
active-passive income distinction for tax crediting purposes.” Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the
System, supra note 5, at 703. We respectfully disagree. For foreign tax credit purposes, theFall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 29
G. Significance of Real, Integrated Business Operations
We conclude that the practical problems of imposing real worldwide
taxation are solvable. A remaining question with respect to the above hy-
pothetical, however, is whether the fact that the DP-FS MNE has real for-
eign business operations that are seamlessly integrated into a unitary
worldwide enterprise means that the United States should excise the DP-
FS MNE’s foreign-source income from the U.S. tax base (i.e., adopt some
form of territoriality) instead of including this income in the U.S. tax base
with a credit for foreign taxes (i.e., apply worldwide taxation to DP).
The worldwide unitary business argument is often made as a justifica-
tion for adoption of a territorial system instead of a real worldwide system.
A representative statement of this argument is as follows:
[TNCs—transnational corporations] exist because of the advan-
tages and synergies that come from combining economic activities
on a large scale and in different locations. These advantages can-
not be attributed to a single location but to the whole global en-
tity. . . . With increased globalization in recent years there has
been a trend towards a more “territorial” basis for taxing TNCs,
as states which are their “home” countries are giving up their
claims to tax their foreign profits. Unitary [i.e., formulary] taxa-
tion would place this on a sounder foundation, as TNCs would be
taxed according to their genuine economic presence in the coun-
tries where they operate.121
For us, however, the fact that the DP-FS MNE has real foreign opera-
tions that form a multinational unitary business is part of the question
rather than the answer. If DP’s foreign operations are on foreign soil be-
cause the before-tax cost-benefit calculation favored the foreign location,
then we are comfortable with DP’s decision to go abroad but see no rea-
son to enhance the favorable cost-benefit outcome by waiving U.S.
residual tax on the resulting foreign income, as would occur under a terri-
torial system. In that situation, the U.S. tax waiver amounts to wastefully
giving a windfall reward to DP for what it would have done anyway. If
DP’s real operations are located on foreign soil primarily because a low
foreign tax coupled with a U.S. territorial system’s abandonment of U.S.
residual tax gave the foreign operations a superior after-tax, cost-benefit
calculation, it clearly would be objectionable for the United States to pro-
vide DP with the difference-making incentive (in the form of exemption
from U.S. residual tax).
concern would be with preventing cross-crediting. This involves separating high-taxed and
low-taxed foreign income and Subpart F is not necessary for this purpose.
121. SOL P ICCIOTTO, TOWARDS U NITARY T AXATION OF T RANSNATIONAL C ORPORA-
TIONS 1 (Tax Justice Network 2012), available at http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/To
wards_Unitary_Taxation_1-1.pdf; see also U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, APPROACHES, supra note 33,
at 1, 86; Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 501, 507; Lebowitz, supra note 6, at
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IV. TRADITIONAL TERRITORIALITY AS A REPLACEMENT REGIME
Suppose that the United States, nevertheless, chose to replace its inco-
herent de facto territorial international income tax system with a tradi-
tional territorial system instead of the real worldwide system described in
Section III, above.122 In such a case, it would find that in comparison to a
real worldwide system,123 a traditional territorial system would have the
following unfortunate characteristics as a consequence of exempting for-
eign-source income from U.S. tax:
1. It would create a distortive incentive for U.S. corporations to
locate their business activities in low-tax foreign countries instead
of in the United States because the foreign business profits would
escape U.S. tax and bear only the low foreign tax, even when re-
patriated to a U.S. parent corporation.124
2. It would violate the principle of ability-to-pay by failing to take
the entire income of U.S. taxpayers into account for purposes of
determining their U.S. tax liability.125
3. It would allow U.S. multinational corporations to effectively
cross-subsidize their U.S. operations and give them a discrimina-
tory advantage in competing in the U.S. market against U.S. busi-
nesses that are purely domestic in scope.126
122. See supra text accompanying notes 66–116.
123. The proper comparison is a well-designed territorial system versus a real world-
wide system that prohibits deferral and cross-crediting. Deferral and cross-crediting are not
immutable if Congress can find the political will to truly reform the present U.S. interna-
tional tax regime. Thus, it is inappropriate to argue in favor of a territorial system by compar-
ing it to the highly defective worldwide system that is currently operated by the United
States. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 32, at 1084–86.
124. In the worst case scenario, U.S. corporations would prefer foreign business activi-
ties over comparable U.S. business activities with higher pre-tax returns because the U.S.
exemption and low foreign tax would give the economically inferior foreign activities a
higher after-tax rate of return than the economically superior U.S. activities. See CBO, OP-
TIONS, supra note 4, at 21–22; Fleming, Peroni, & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 32, at
1084–86; GRAVELLE, REFORM, supra note 17, at 5–6; Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A
Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI. L. REV.
975, 983 (1997) [hereinafter Peroni, Back to the Future]. Assuming that the territorial system
extended exemption both to dividends received by U.S. parent corporations out of the for-
eign business profits of foreign subsidiaries and to profits of foreign branches, the location
distortion problem would be the same regardless of whether a U.S. corporation conducted
foreign activities through a foreign subsidiary or a foreign branch.
125. See Fleming, Peroni, & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 32, at 1093–98; Peroni, Back
to the Future, supra note 124, at 981–82.
126. See OECD ACTION PLAN, supra note 24, at 8 (“[C]orporations that operate only in
domestic markets, including family-owned businesses or new innovative companies, have dif-
ficulty competing with MNEs that have the ability to shift their profits across borders to
avoid or reduce tax”); Clemons, Cook & Kinney, supra note 16, at 97–98; Kadet, supra note
34, at 299; Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 8, at 124–25, 135; Kleinbard, Stateless Income,
supra note 4, at 713; Wells, Homeless Income, supra note 8, at 5; see also Rosenbloom, Why
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4. Compared with a real worldwide system, it would lose revenue
in the form of forgone U.S. residual tax from existing foreign busi-
ness activity and from new activity that would shift abroad.127
5. It would encourage U.S. taxpayers to employ strategies that al-
low income to be treated as having its source in a low-tax foreign
country even though that country has little economic connection
with the income’s production.128
6. It would increase the incentive for U.S. taxpayers to use ag-
gressive transfer pricing to increase the amount of income that is
characterized as exempt foreign-source income.129
7. It would perpetuate the use of the complex, imprecise, contro-
versy-producing, and, perhaps, unadministerable arm’s-length ap-
proach to policing aggressive transfer pricing.130
8. It would provide an incentive for U.S. multinationals to create
difficult transfer pricing controversies by undercharging foreign
subsidiaries for the use of intangibles and compensating for the
undercharges with increased dividends in an attempt to convert
taxable royalty income into exempt dividends.131
In prior work, we concluded that when a traditional territorial system
is compared with a real U.S. worldwide system that prohibits deferral and
base company sales income rules would create an unjustified competitive advantage for con-
trolled foreign sales corporations versus U.S. domestic sellers).
127. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing, supra note 22, at 408–09; see also CBO,
OPTIONS, supra note 4, at 23. Territorial systems effectively waive residual tax by expressly
excluding foreign-source business income from the tax base. By contrast, the current, un-
reformed U.S. international income tax system waives residual tax indirectly by means of
deferral and cross-crediting. The forgone residual tax is effectively a subsidy to the foreign
activities of U.S. MNEs. Thus, to the extent that the loss of U.S. residual tax is justified by
arguments that U.S. exports will increase, it is analogous to an export subsidy. See generally
Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 8, at 129, 157. Orthodox economic theory holds that export
subsidies are wasteful, even when also offered by competitor nations. See David Brumbaugh,
Export Tax Subsidies, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION & TAX POLICY 130, 132 (Joseph
J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel & Jane G. Gravelle eds., 2d ed. 2005).
128. See also U.S. SENATE P ERMANENT S UBCOMMITTEE ON I NVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON H OMELAND S ECURITY AND G OVERNMENT A FFAIRS, HEARING ON O FF-
SHORE PROFIT SHIFTING AND THE U.S. TAX CODE, Exhibit 1, Memorandum from Chairman
Carl Levin and Senator Tom Coburn to Subcommittee Members, Offshore Profit Shifting and
the Internal Revenue Code, at 20–22 (Sept. 20, 2012) (describing Microsoft’s use of Puerto
Rico to avoid U.S. tax on sales to the United States), available at http://www.hsgac.senate
.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/offshore-profit-shifting-and-the-us-tax-code. See
generally Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 4.
129. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 33, at 32; Ben-
shalom Rethinking, supra note 8, at 437; Fleming, Peroni, & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 32,
at 1084; Thompson, supra note 2, at 575.
130. See sources cited supra note 61.
131. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 4, at 18; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives,
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cross-crediting, the preceding eight characteristics make a traditional terri-
torial system unacceptable as a replacement for the present U.S. interna-
tional income tax regime.132 However, formulary apportionment
advocates argue that we must reverse our conclusion if the territorial sys-
tem is of the formulary apportionment variety instead of a traditional ter-
ritorial system.133 We respectfully disagree with that argument.
V. GLOBAL FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT AS A
REPLACEMENT REGIME
A. Asymmetries
Some global formulary apportionment advocates suggest that if the
United States makes a unilateral march down the formulary path, the
world’s other major economies will likely follow suit and a somewhat co-
ordinated worldwide regime will emerge extemporaneously.134 By con-
trast, some opponents of global formulary apportionment take a contrary
view. They argue that the nations of the world are unlikely to move to-
gether to a formulary apportionment system employing a uniform alloca-
tion formula135 and they are also unlikely to adopt uniform rules
regarding the definition of income and the timing of its recognition.136
According to this view, if the United States were to adopt global formu-
lary apportionment, it would find itself (1) in a world in which its formu-
lary system struggles to interact with the arm’s-length systems prevailing in
other nations, or (2) in a world of nations that have adopted global formu-
lary apportionment but with diverse allocation formulas, or (3) in a world
that chaotically conflates (1) and (2). Either way, these asymmetries be-
tween the U.S. system and the rest of the world would produce large
amounts of international income that is either double-taxed or not taxed
anywhere. Because both double taxation and non-taxation distort tax-
132. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 32.
133. See e.g., Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 507–15; Bravenec, supra
note 2, at 848–50; Sheppard, Transfer Pricing, supra note 5.
134. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 509–10, 519–20; Bravenec,
supra note 2, at 850; Sheppard, Transfer Pricing, supra note 5, at 472.
135. See Morse, Revisiting, supra note 24, at 607–25; Roin, Can the Income Tax Be
Saved, supra note 7, at 228–29; Weiner, supra note 52, at 1165; Wilkins & Gideon, supra note
64, at 1353; see also Sheppard, Twilight, supra note 2, at 8. However, the OECD has an-
nounced a plan under which member countries and other nations would act to deal with base
erosion and profit shifting (popularly referred to as “BEPS”) in the international area. See
generally OECD ACTION PLAN, supra note 24; Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX
REV. 55 (2014) [hereinafter Brauner, BEPS]. Although this program has barely begun to be
implemented and its ultimate effect is unpredictable, it might create momentum for coordi-
nated international action that would facilitate a multilateral formulary apportionment re-
gime. However, it is presently too early to tell and, in the near term, the OECD Action Plan
clearly indicates continued support of the arm’s-length method. OECD ACTION PLAN, supra
note 24, at 14, 20; Ajay Gupta, BEPS Action 8: Arm’s Length Is Still the Mantra, 144 TAX
NOTES 1358 (2014).
136. See Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 222–29; Wilkins &
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payer behavior (including locational choice for business activity), the like-
lihood of these outcomes is cited by opponents as a reason not to replace
the current U.S. system with global formulary apportionment.137
We agree with those who are skeptical that other countries will follow
unilateral action by the United States toward a formulary apportionment
system and we do see unilateral action by the United States in adopting
formulary apportionment as likely to create asymmetries. Indeed, this is a
problem with all of the alternative formulary apportionment propos-
als.However, we choose to not discuss this point at length here. We ob-
serve that the present U.S. international income tax system is already
characterized by inconsistent outcomes that produce double-taxed and
non-taxed income,138 although most instances of double taxation are han-
dled under the mutual agreement articles of the worldwide treaty network
in a way that yields tolerable results for the MNE community.139 Still,
there is a substantial question regarding how a global formulary appor-
tionment regime would be reconciled with existing income tax treaties.
Nonetheless, it is possible that double taxation resulting from asymmetries
between a U.S. global formulary system and the formulary or arm’s-length
systems of other countries could be handled under amended bilateral
agreements, although serious difficulties in transitioning to and applying a
new system could be anticipated.140
As for double non-taxation, that phenomenon does not produce tax-
payer complaints and is often the perfectly legal result of mismatches be-
tween two countries’ tax systems. So it goes mostly uncorrected by the
various national taxing authorities, thus resulting in erosion of the tax ba-
ses of the countries involved. It is, however, unclear whether this problem
would be materially worse for the United States under a properly designed
U.S. global formulary apportionment system than it is under the present
137. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 4, at 23; Angus, Neubig, Solomon & Weinberger,
supra note 5, at 64; Morse, Revisiting, supra note 24, at 631; Rosenbloom, Angels on a Pin,
supra note 6, at 524; Weiner, supra note 52, at 1165–67; Wilkins & Gideon, supra note 64, at
1355; see also OECD ACTION PLAN, supra note 24, at 14 (“[T]here is consensus among gov-
ernments that moving to a system of formulary apportionment of profits is not a viable way
forward.”).
138. See Brauner, supra note 24, at 163; Michael C. Durst, Untangling Double Taxation
in Transfer Pricing Policymaking, 134 TAX NOTES 1689 (2012).
139. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, UNITED S TATES M ODEL I NCOME T AX C ONVENTION OF
NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. XXV; U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, UNITED STATES MODEL TECHNICAL EX-
PLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NO-
VEMBER 15, 2006 art. XXV (mutual agreement procedure); Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16
I.R.B. 911 (Apr. 15, 2013) (74% of the advanced pricing agreements entered into by the IRS
in calendar year 2012 were bilateral arrangements negotiated under treaty mutual agreement
articles and 59% of such agreements entered into by the IRS in the years 1991–2011, inclu-
sive, were bilateral or multilateral arrangements negotiated under treaty mutual agreement
provisions).
140. But see Wilkins & Gideon, supra note 64, at 1353 (arguing that the mutual agree-
ment procedure would be less effective under formulary apportionment because there would
be no agreed allocation principle, such as the arm’s-length standard, on which to base
negotiations).34 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
U.S. arm’s-length system, particularly if there were a “throw back” rule of
untaxed income to the country apportioning the income.141
Thus, it seems unclear to us whether the existing problems of interna-
tional double taxation and non-taxation would be either materially im-
proved or worsened by substitution of a global formulary apportionment
system for the current U.S. international income tax system. In other
words, double taxation and non-taxation, though important, should not be
dispositive factors regarding the choice between global formulary appor-
tionment and the existing U.S. international income tax system.
B. Three-Factor Formulary Apportionment
Most of what is known about the structure and effects of formulary
apportionment systems comes from their extensive use by the U.S. states
to tax the incomes of corporations operating in multiple states without
violating the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.142 When these state systems were initially created, they employed an
allocation formula based on three equally weighted factors—the corpora-
tion’s sales, assets, and payroll.143 If this three-factor approach were ap-
plied on a combined reporting basis to DP and FS in the above
hypothetical, transactions between members of the DP-FS MNE would be
ignored, allocable profits would be calculated entirely on the basis of
transactions with parties outside the DP-FS MNE,144 and the results
would look like this:
141. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 520; see also Uniform Division
of Income for Tax Purposes Act, § 16 (2002) (sales of tangible personal property either to the
U.S. government or that are not taxable in the state of the purchaser are allocated to the
taxing state). For data regarding the shifting of profits out of the United States, which is the
foundational strategy for creating double non-taxed income, see CBO, OPTIONS, supra note
4, at 16; Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 4, at 737–50.
142. See 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER H ELLERSTEIN, STATE T AXATION 9-
11—9-23 (3d ed. 2000); Sheppard, Transfer Pricing, supra note 5, at 472.
143. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 142, at 8-64-8-67, 9-16; Roin, Can
the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 202; see also Wilkins & Gideon, supra note 64, at
1356-57 (discussing the practical problems of applying these factors).
144. See IMF, SPILLOVERS, supra note 6, at 39; PICCIOTO, supra note 121, at 10; Avi-
Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 508; Altshuler & Grubert, Formula Apportion-
ment, supra note 8, at 1145; Bravenec, supra note 2, at 848–49; Cummings, supra note 116, at
148–49; Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 214; Sheppard, Transfer Pric-
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TABLE 1
U.S. assets of DP and FS × Worldwide × 1/3 = Worldwide profits
Total worldwide assets of profits of allocated to United
DP and FS DP and States per assets
FS factor
U.S. payroll of DP and FS × Worldwide × 1/3 = Worldwide profits
Total worldwide payroll of profits of allocated to United
DP and FS DP and States per payroll
FS factor
U.S. sales of DP and FS × Worldwide × 1/3 = Worldwide profits
Total worldwide sales of profits of allocated to United
DP and FS DP and States per sales factor
FS
Profits taxable by the United States = Sum of above three items145
Profits treated as exempt foreign = Worldwide profits minus
income profits taxable by the
United States
This approach does have the beneficial effect of making transfer pric-
ing rules, source rules, and residence rules irrelevant because none of
those features plays a role in the three-factor allocation formula.146 Stated
differently, objections 5-8 to traditional territoriality in Section IV,
above,147 largely would be eliminated. To that extent, three-factor formu-
lary apportionment may be simpler and more easily administered than ei-
ther traditional territorial taxation or worldwide taxation, but it is likely to
substitute a new set of difficulties in place of the problems with arm’s-
length pricing.
Most significantly, the distortive effect of the three-factor formulary
approach is obvious. Just as traditional territoriality encourages U.S. cor-
porations to locate operations in low-tax countries, the assets and payroll
factors stimulate the same behavior by encouraging U.S. corporations to
increase the amount of income that qualifies for exemption by moving as-
sets and workers (i.e., business operations) to low-tax foreign countries.148
145. See ARNOLD & MCINTYRE, supra note 60, at 78; MICHAEL J. GRAETZ,
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 411 (2003); Roin, Can the Income Tax
Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 202.
146. See IMF, SPILLOVERS, supra note 6, at 39; Morse, Revisiting, supra note 24, at
600–01; Sheppard, Transfer Pricing, supra note 5, at 473.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 124–131.
148. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 4, at 23; IMF, SPILLOVERS, supra note 6, at 41;
Michael J. Graetz & Rachel Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition, and
the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 418 (2013)
(“[I]ncluding wages and physical capital in the formula creates incentives for shifting labor
and capital to low-tax jurisdictions . . . .); Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the System, supra note
5, at 705 (“Labor and payrolls are particularly convenient for manipulating the formula to36 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
Indeed, there appear to be virtually no limitations on shifting income by
moving the assets and payroll factors of formulary apportionment to low-
tax locations. Moreover, we will see below149 that the sales factor is mo-
bile as well. Thus, it would be possible to structure the DP-FS MNE so
that nearly 100 percent of all three factor elements was attributable to FS.
As a result, almost 100 percent of the DP-FS MNE’s income would be
allocated to low-taxed FS and excluded from the U.S. tax base.150 In addi-
tion, the source rules employed by high-tax foreign countries would gener-
ally treat this income as sourced to FS’s low-tax location and, therefore, as
not subject to high foreign tax.
Not only does three-factor formulary apportionment distort U.S.
MNE decisions regarding the location of assets and workers, it also dis-
criminates against U.S. corporations that operate and sell only in the
United States and, therefore, cannot take advantage of low foreign tax
rates and the favorable treatment of export sales. It thereby adversely af-
fects the ability of these U.S. corporations to compete against MNEs.151 In
addition, it encourages U.S. MNEs to do business with the foreign affili-
ates to which assets and workers have been shifted rather than with inde-
pendent foreign parties.152 However, these latter two distortions tend to
follow from the decision to move assets and workers to low-tax foreign
countries, and so our analysis will focus on that phenomenon.
In contrast to the virtually unrestrained income shifting that is possi-
ble under three-factor formulary apportionment, the arm’s-length ap-
proach, although generally savaged by the commentators, actually imposes
a limited degree of restraint on income shifting. It does so, however, at the
cost of a substantial burden on both taxpayers and the IRS, and the
amount of restraint is indeed somewhat modest.
These points are illustrated by Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner.153 The simplified facts are that B & L, a U.S. resident corporation,
shift excess returns.”); see also Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 203–10
(describing income-shifting opportunities arising from manipulation of the apportionment
factors). See generally Altshuler & Grubert, Formula Apportionment, supra note 8; James R.
Hines, Jr., Income Misattribution under Formula Apportionment, 54 EUR. ECON. REV. 108
(2010).
149. See infra text accompanying notes 169–187.
150. This prompts the question of what is wrong with allocating 100% of the Gizmo
profits to FS if 100% of the income-producing factors are attributable to FS? What is wrong
is that to reach that result, DP had to shift resources from a U.S. investment opportunity that
would yield 15% before tax to a Lowtaxia investment with a 13% before-tax rate of return
and formulary apportionment provided the incentive to make that shift. See supra text ac-
companying notes 34–42.
151. See Altshuler & Grubert, Formula Apportionment, supra note 8, at 1146–47. Re-
garding the favorable treatment of export sales, see GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note
2, at 109–11, 406–08.
152. See id. Under current law, the arm’s-length rules have a similar effect in practice. It
often will be advantageous to orchestrate a transaction with an affiliate in a low-tax country
in order to shift income rather than to sell directly to an unrelated person.
153. 92 T.C. 525 (1989), aff’d, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991).Fall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 37
owned all the shares of B & L Ireland, an Irish resident corporation. The
latter manufactured soft contact lenses for $1.50 each and sold them to B
& L for $7.50 each. B & L resold the lenses in the U.S. market for $16.00
each. Under this arrangement, $8.50 of the $14.50 profit inherent in each
lens was allocated to B & L,154 which paid a current U.S. tax on this
amount. The remaining $6.00 of profit was attributed to B & L Ireland,
which paid tax at the low Irish rate, and U.S. tax thereon was deferred
until repatriation occurred.155 The IRS attempted to use the arm’s-length
approach to impose a $3.00 per lens price on B & L Ireland’s sales to B &
L so that the profit split would be $13.00 to B & L156 and $1.50 to B & L
Ireland. B & L persuaded the Tax Court to reject the IRS position and
uphold the division of $8.50 profit to B & L and $6.00 to B & L Ireland.
Thus, the IRS suffered a substantial defeat under the arm’s-length ap-
proach (the $6.00 profit allocated to B & L Ireland was 400 percent larger
than the $1.50 profit allocation proposed by the IRS). Nevertheless, if
there had been no constraint on transfer pricing, B & L Ireland would
have sold each lens to B & L for $16.00 so that the entire $14.50 profit
would have been assigned to low-tax Ireland and no current U.S. income
tax would have been paid. From that standpoint, the arm’s-length result of
an $8.50 per lens allocation of profit to the U.S. tax base shows that the
arm’s-length approach can impose a modicum of restraint on income shift-
ing. By contrast, the only constraints on income shifting under a three-
factor formulary apportionment method come from outside the tax rules.
The costs of the arm’s-length approach are, however, suggested by the fact
that more than eight years elapsed between the first tax year involved in
Bausch & Lomb and the Tax Court’s decision (which required an 86-page
opinion) and more than two additional years passed before the Second
Circuit concluded the litigation by affirming the Tax Court.
Weighing these considerations against each other in order to choose
between three-factor formulary apportionment and the present U.S. sys-
tem with its arm’s-length approach yields unsatisfactory choices. Both
three-factor formulary apportionment and the current de facto U.S. terri-
torial system are open to objections 1-4 in Section IV, above,157 to the
same extent as traditional territoriality. Thus, we regard the substitution of
three-factor formulary apportionment for either the existing de facto U.S.
territorial regime or for traditional territoriality as the equivalent of put-
ting lipstick on a pig. Possible simplification benefits under a formulary
154. $16.00 (sales price to U.S. buyers) - $7.50 (B & L’s cost) = $8.50.
155. Because B & L Ireland manufactured the lenses in Ireland, the corporation’s place
of incorporation, its profits were not foreign base company sales income and, thus, not Sub-
part F income, so they did not result in Subpart F inclusions for B & L. See I.R.C. §§ 951(a),
954(a), (d) (2014); Treas. Reg. § 1.954–3(a)(4). See generally 1 JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J.
PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ¶ 3.05 (1992, 2005, & 2014 Cum. Supp. No. 2). As
noted at supra note 36, this manufacturing exception is a major defect of current law Subpart
F.
156. $16.00 (sales price to U.S. buyers) - $3.00 (B & L’s cost) = $13.00.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 124–127.38 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
approach would be welcome, but likely overstated as MNEs would seek to
relocate factors and the IRS would resist allocations to implausible loca-
tions. Moreover, the more important distortive, inequitable, and revenue-
loss aspects of the territorial pig persist underneath the simplification lip-
stick. Thus, in our judgment, it is clear that in spite of any simplification
gains, three-factor formulary apportionment would be inferior to the op-
tion of reforming the present U.S. system into a real worldwide system.
C. Two-Factor Formulary Apportionment
1. “Activities”
Professors Reuven Avi-Yonah and Kimberly Clausing and Mr.
Michael Durst jointly authored a thoughtful and widely discussed propo-
sal158 that attempts to respond to the defects of three-factor formulary
apportionment. Their proposal begins by dividing MNEs into “activities,”
which they define essentially the same as the unitary business concept
used in the formulary corporation tax regimes of the U.S. states.159 The
states must utilize the unitary business concept160 to comply with the U.S.
Constitution’s Commerce Clause161 and the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.162 The Commerce Clause is
clearly not a constraint on the federal government,163 and the Due Process
Clause is unlikely to be a meaningful limitation on federal taxing pow-
ers.164 Thus, the decision by the three authors to divide MNEs along the
lines of “activities” seems unnecessary when their objective is to construct
a federal tax regime rather than a state-level system. Fortunately, at the
level of our analysis, this limitation does not significantly affect the sub-
stance of their proposal, and we will not deal with it further.
2. Imputed Return
The proposal of these three authors would replace three-factor formu-
lary apportionment with a two-factor approach. The first factor would in-
volve separately summing up the MNE’s deductible annual business
expenses (including depreciation and amortization) in each country in
which it does business and then allocating an imputed annual return on
that sum for each respective country.165 The authors state that under their
158. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2.
159. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 508.
160. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 303–04 (1994).
161. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
162. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
163. See Morse, Revisiting, supra note 24, at 633.
164. See Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved, supra note 7, at 215; Stephen E. Shay, J.
Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, “What’s Source
Got to Do with It”: Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 91 n.29
(2002); Sheppard, Transfer Pricing, supra note 5, at 472.
165. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 508, 544. This description of the
first factor accurately reflects the text of the Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst proposal but the
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proposal “the tax incentive to locate plant and equipment, as well as em-
ployment, in low-tax countries would be reduced.”166 This strikes us as
wrong with respect to the imputed return factor. Deductible business ex-
penses (including depreciation) would seem to be mere proxies for the
assets and payroll factors of three-factor formulary apportionment.167
Thus, just as there would be an incentive to shift to low-tax countries the
business property and jobs that are the basis of assets and payroll factors,
it seems clear that there would be a similar incentive to shift to low-tax
countries the business property and jobs that are the principal basis of the
deductible expenses used in calculating the proposal’s imputed income
factor. Stated differently, it is quite doubtful that there is a decisive differ-
ence, in terms of incentive effects, between the imputed income factor of
two-factor formulary apportionment and the assets and payroll factors of
three-factor formulary apportionment.168 Consequently, this change in
structure does not strike us as significantly ameliorating the defects of
three-factor formulary apportionment. If the two-factor proposal is to be a
meaningful improvement, the gains will have to be found in the second
factor, to which we now turn.
3. Sales Factor
The second factor of the Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst proposal pro-
vides that if an MNE has worldwide annual income in excess of the net
income imputed by the first factor, that excess will be allocated among the
relevant countries by using a sales ratio. With respect to the United States,
the ratio would be the relationship of an MNE’s U.S. sales to its world-
wide sales.169 The MNE’s worldwide income in excess of the imputed
amounts would then be multiplied by this ratio and the result would be
allocated to the U.S. tax base. The United States would treat the MNE’s
remaining excess income as exempt foreign income. The authors of the
two-factor proposal believe that this approach will eliminate the incentive
with the proposal’s text. Id. at 540–41. This Article assumes that the intent of the authors is to
follow the language in the proposal’s text.
166. See id. at 507.
167. Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst seem to concede this point. See id. at 509, 517.
168. Because intangibles typically do not generate depreciation deductions, their role in
the imputed income factor would be limited to the extent to which their development costs
produce deductible business expenses. Thus, the imputed income factor should not create an
incentive to move old intangibles to low-tax foreign countries. It would likely, however, pro-
vide an incentive to incur the development costs of new intangibles in such countries.
The intensity of the imputed income factor’s incentive impact would seem to vary with
profit margins. In a high-margin business, expenses are less significant in comparison to reve-
nue than in a low-margin business. Thus, the imputed income factor’s incentive effect should
be greatest with respect to low-margin businesses. See also Morse, Revisiting, supra note 24,
at 630 (explaining how formulary apportionment may create a distortive incentive for profit-
able firms with large apportionment factors in high-tax countries to merge with less profita-
ble firms that have large apportionment factors in low-tax countries).
169. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 508–09, 513; Morse, Revisiting,
supra note 24, at 603–04.40 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
to shift the excess portion of an MNE’s income to low-tax countries. They
defend this conclusion by stating that:
[S]ales are far less responsive to tax differences across markets
than investment in plant, and employment, as the customers
themselves are far less mobile than firm assets or employment.
Even in a high-tax country, firms have an incentive to sell as much
as possible.170
Although we agree with the second sentence of this statement, we re-
gard it as beside the point because the first sentence is surely wrong or
overstated. When closely analyzed, the sales component of the two-factor
approach seems vulnerable to significant manipulation that would erode
the U.S. tax base.
Under present U.S. federal income tax law, sales generally are
deemed to occur where the seller’s right, title, and interest pass to the
buyer.171 This is commonly known as the title-passage rule. If it were used
in applying two-factor formulary apportionment, the result would be virtu-
ally unlimited income shifting by U.S. MNEs to low-tax countries because
taxpayers would have broad discretion to locate the place of title passage
in whichever country yields the most favorable tax results.172 Well-advised
U.S. MNEs would structure most of their sales to take place under the
title-passage rule in low- or zero-tax foreign countries. The good news is
that this would not necessarily encourage U.S. MNEs to move their opera-
tions to low-tax countries. The bad news, however, is that the ratio of an
MNE’s U.S. sales to worldwide sales readily could be made to approach
zero with the result that virtually all of the MNE’s excess profits attributa-
ble to U.S. economic activity would be shifted to low-tax foreign countries.
170. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 509. But see Altshuler & Grub-
ert, Formula Apportionment, supra note 8, at 1171–72.
171. See Treas. Reg. § 1.861–7(c).
172. See A.P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383 (Ct. Cl. 1960). This same
criticism applies to using place of delivery as the criterion for determining the location of a
sale.
Treas. Reg. § 1.861–7(c) contains the following caveat:
[In] any case in which the sales transaction is arranged in a particular manner for
the primary purpose of tax avoidance, the [title-passage rule] will not be applied.
In such cases, all factors in the transaction, such as negotiations, the execution of
the agreement, the location of the property, and the place of payment, will be
considered, and the sale will be treated as having been consummated at the place
where the substance of the sale occurred.
However, as a practical matter, the IRS has been unsuccessful in using this caveat to overturn
a favorable taxpayer result achieved under the title-passage rule. See e.g., 3 BORIS I. BITTKER
& LAWRENCE L OKKEN, FEDERAL T AXATION OF I NCOME, ESTATES AND G IFTS 73–42 to
73–43 (3d ed. 2005); GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 100. This is not surprising
because taxpayers can usually produce a nontax purpose for having the right, title, and inter-
est in property pass in a tax-favorable location. Moreover, the alternative factors involved in
the preceding caveat, which apply if the title-passage rule does not apply by reason of this
tax-avoidance exception, can be readily placed in a tax-favorable venue.Fall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 41
The shifted profits would be treated as foreign income that is exempt from
U.S. tax and subject only to low or zero foreign tax. This would have the
potential for massive erosion of the U.S. tax base.
The advocates of the sales location approach have recognized the ero-
sion problem resulting from the title-passage rule and propose to deal with
it by employing a rule that treats sales as occurring at the location of the
customer.173 This would reduce traditional territoriality’s incentive to site
business operations in low-tax foreign countries because business location
would not be relevant under the customer location definition of place of
sale. The complexities and other problems arising from source rules and
transfer pricing rules in traditional territorial systems would also be elimi-
nated. Finally, the advocates of the customer location approach hope that
it will be much less manipulable than the title-passage rule.
However, the customer location component of two-factor formulary
apportionment would, just like traditional territoriality, violate the princi-
ple of ability-to-pay by excluding foreign income of U.S. residents from
the U.S. tax base. It would also preserve the discrimination against domes-
tic U.S. businesses with exclusively U.S. customers vis-` a-vis U.S. MNEs
that can use profits from exports and low-taxed foreign operations to
cross-subsidize their other U.S. activities. In addition, it would lose reve-
nue, in the form of foregone U.S. residual tax, when compared with a true
worldwide system that prohibits deferral and cross-crediting.174
Finally, as the following example indicates, the customer location
component can also be manipulated to erode the U.S. tax base by shifting
income to low-tax foreign countries.175
Example 2: Assume that P, a U.S. corporation, locates its only fac-
tory in an Irish branch, manufactures all of its products in Ireland,
and sells them at fair market prices to I Co, an unrelated Irish
corporate distributor/retailer that thereafter sells the products
173. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 509 (“Sales would be deter-
mined on a destination-basis, based on the location of the customer rather than the location
of production.”).
174. Surprisingly, Altshuler and Grubert calculate that the United States would gain
more revenue from adopting formulary apportionment than from repealing deferral. How-
ever, their calculation seems to assume that deferral repeal would involve unlimited cross-
crediting of foreign taxes against foreign income and they caution that their estimates are
static and that taxpayers can avail themselves of many tax-minimization opportunities under
formulary apportionment that are not available if deferral is repealed. See Altshuler & Grub-
ert, Formula Apportionment, supra note 8, at 1167–70. Moreover, any effective tax reform
proposal that repeals deferral should be combined with significant restraints on cross-
crediting.
175. See IMF, SPILLOVERS, supra note 6, at 41 (noting that “[i]f a destination-based
measure of sales is used . . . there is an incentive to route sales through low-tax jurisdictions
(as is easy to do)”); Morse, Revisiting, supra note 24, at 620–23; see also id. at 634 (discussing
manipulation opportunities when sales location is defined as place of delivery); Roin, Can the
Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 207–08 (same); DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 80 (2014) (stating that the Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst pro-
posal “may understate the effective manipulability of the sales factor”).42 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
into the U.S. market. On these facts, the sales to I Co account for
100 percent of P’s worldwide sales. Because I Co and P are unre-
lated, the Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst two-factor approach
would apparently treat I Co as P’s “customer” and would regard
Ireland as the location of P’s sales to I Co.176 Thus, the ratio of P’s
U.S. sales to worldwide sales would be zero U.S. sales divided by
the amount of Irish sales. When P’s worldwide income is multi-
plied by this ratio, nothing would be allocated to the United
States. P’s income would be allocated entirely to Ireland (the loca-
tion of the arm’s-length customer) and would bear only the low
Irish tax.177 The U.S. tax base would suffer accordingly. Of
course, these results would occur even if the products sold to I Co
176. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 513 (“[T]he approach suggested
here is relatively simple since it requires only (1) defining activities . . . and (2) establishing
. . . the destination of arm’s-length sales of goods and services); see also id. at 517–18. The
sales location proposal contains this statement:
A central challenge of implementing the proposed statute (or any statute with for-
mulary elements) will be to deal effectively with the need to determine the geo-
graphic distribution of a party’s sales revenue. The need to distinguish sales for
final use as opposed to storage or transshipment, and the difficulties of determin-
ing locations of sales of raw materials and intermediate goods, intangible property
and certain services (e.g., financial services), will require toleration of some degree
of reasonable estimation and generally will require some restraint in enforcement.
Id. at 517–18. However, this does not appear to contradict the conclusion that P’s sales are
located where it sells goods in arm’s-length transactions to independent buyers.
177. See Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 229 (“If taxpayers are
willing to substitute contractual arrangements with unrelated parties for vertical integration
through ownership, the reach of formulary apportionment systems would be substantially
blunted.”).
In an earlier iteration of the two-factor formulary apportionment proposal, two of the
three authors made the following statements:
While it is possible that taxpayers may try to avoid taxation by using independent
distributing agents for their sales, it is unlikely that they would be willing to relin-
quish real control over their marketing and distribution activities, since that is why
they are organized in MNE form in the first place. In addition, we would adopt a
look-through rule that would regard any sales made by an MNE to an unrelated
distributor as sales made into the United States if the distributor sells the good into
the United States and does not substantially transform them before they are re-
sold. This would prevent MNEs from avoiding tax by selling their goods into the
United States via unrelated strawmen who would themselves have minimal profits.
Kimberly A. Clausing & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global
Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment 20 (The Hamilton Project 2007),
available at http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/Reforming_Corporate
_Taxation_in_a_Global_Economy-_A_Proposal_to_Adopt_Formulary_Apportionment.pdf.
As noted by two other commentators:
For companies that produce and sell high-valued final products for which there is
value in the marketing of a brand . . ., using an unrelated party to complete the sale
would be problematic because it would require relinquishing some control over the
value chain. For companies that produce and sell high-valued intermediate prod-Fall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 43
were manufactured by P in the United States and exported. Thus,
in this scenario, the sales location component of two-factor formu-
lary apportionment does not involve an incentive to move opera-
tions to a foreign country,178 but the incentive for U.S. MNEs to
restructure their activities by relying on independent in-
termediaries is distortive along a separate margin. More impor-
tantly, the income-shifting detriment to the U.S. tax base is clear
and substantial. Moreover, as noted above, the imputed income
factor of the Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst proposal would en-
courage the shifting of business operations and employment out
of the United States.
The customer location component of the two-factor approach could
be modified to address Example 2 by adopting a look-through rule that
would attempt to trace the movement of P’s products through I Co to the
ultimate U.S. consumers. This would, however, be administratively chal-
lenging,179 particularly where a product is a component of other products,
and would encourage the Ps of the world to make tracing difficult by cre-
ating more complex chains of independent distributors. This dilemma sug-
gests that we consider the presumption approach found in Section 1.954-
ucts, such as computer chips and software, using an unrelated party to complete
the sale would entail less risk and may be possible.
Michael Udell & Aditi Vashist, Sales-Factor Apportionment of Profits to Broaden the Tax
Base, 144 TAX NOTES 155, 164 (2014).
We respectfully disagree. It would seem likely that the tax savings from operating
through independent distributors would drive manufacturers to do so, which would draw
more and better distributors into the field, which would reduce the margins earned by the
distributors, which would make the independent distributor model even more attractive. See
generally Altshuler & Grubert, Formula Apportionment, supra note 8, at 1171–72. Regarding
the strong impact of tax savings on the business location decision, see Harry Grubert & John
Mutti, Do Taxes Influence Where U.S. Corporations Invest? 53 NAT’L T AX J. 825 (2000);
Donald J. Rousslang, Deferral and Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income, 53
NAT’L TAX J. 589, 596 (2000). A look-through rule would complicate the two-factor proposal
and would be difficult to administer. See infra note 179. Perhaps this is why the most recent
version of the two-factor proposal omits a look-through rule. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing &
Durst, supra note 2.
178. See also Morse, Revisiting, supra note 24, at 615–24 (analyzing and expressing
doubt regarding the argument that the sales location component would cause MNEs to move
business operations into the United States). Royalty receipts do not seem to be included in
the sales factor. Thus, there would be no U.S. tax advantage under the Avi-Yonah, Clausing,
and Durst formula for a U.S. MNE to create low-taxed foreign income by locating in-
tangibles in a low-tax country and making deductible royalty payments from a high-tax coun-
try to the low-tax country. However, to the extent that valuable intangibles increase P’s Irish
sales revenue in Example 2, the effect is to advantageously move intangible income into low-
tax Ireland.
179. See Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the System, supra note 5, at 705 (“The final sales
may be very difficult to trace, particularly if the product is a component incorporated into a
final good.”), 706 (“The difficulty of identifying the location of the ultimate consumer is
particularly acute in the case of business software and capital equipment. They can contribute
to the production of a variety of goods and services over a long period of time.”); Morse,
Revisiting, supra note 24, at 623–24.44 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
3(a)(3)(ii) of the regulations as a solution to the tracing problem. This reg-
ulation provides that for purposes of Section 954(d)(1)’s definition of for-
eign base company sales income, when personal property is sold to an
unrelated person, it is presumed to be sold for use, consumption, or dispo-
sition in the country of the property’s destination unless at the time of sale,
the seller knew, or should have known, that the property was bound for
some other country. In that case, the country of use, consumption, or dis-
position will presumptively be other than the seller’s country unless the
seller can prove to the contrary. If this approach were used to determine
customer location in two-factor formulary apportionment, it would seem
to leave P with exactly the result it wants in Example 2—i.e., with 100
percent Irish sales. But if the rule were reversed so that sales were pre-
sumed to be located in P’s country unless P could prove that the ultimate
customer was elsewhere, then the income-shifting strategy in Example 2
would be defeated. This approach would, however, move the tracing bur-
den from the IRS to MNEs and also move the system in the direction of
worldwide taxation. U.S. MNEs could be expected to exert intense lobby-
ing power to prevent adoption of such a rule. In the end, it seems highly
likely that Example 2 illustrates an easily executed income-shifting strat-
egy that would be fully effective under the Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and
Durst proposal.
For a variation on Example 2, consider the following:
Example 3: Assume that P, a U.S. corporation, manufactures its
products in the United States and sells 100 percent of them to its
wholly owned Irish subsidiary, I Sub, which sells the products to
unrelated Irish consumers and to unrelated Irish distributors that
sell them to consumers throughout the European Union. For the
sake of simplicity, also assume that the sales by I Sub account for
100 percent of the P-I Sub MNE’s worldwide sales. Because all
the sales by I Sub are to unrelated buyers and occur at the loca-
tion of the customers in Ireland, the ratio of the P-I Sub MNE’s
U.S. sales to worldwide sales would again be zero U.S. sales di-
vided by the amount of Irish sales and 100 percent of the profits of
the P-I Sub MNE in excess of the imputed return to deductible
expenses would be excluded from the U.S. tax base and taxed at
the low Irish rate. This would occur even though no transfer pric-
ing shenanigans are involved and even though a substantial por-
tion of the P-I Sub MNE’s profits is attributable to P’s U.S.
manufacturing activity. Moreover, I Sub does not seem to be a
necessary player. P could achieve the same result by exporting di-
rectly to independent Irish distributors. And would the unrelated
distributors need to be Irish? If an unrelated German distributor
created an Irish permanent establishment with authority to make
purchases from P, might this not mean that Ireland is the location
of the customer so that the profits from the sales of P’s products
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be wholly excluded from the U.S. tax base and taxed at the low
Irish rate?180
With respect to Example 3, it would be possible in theory to stop the
income shifting occurring there by modifying the sales factor to incorpo-
rate Subpart F’s foreign base company sales income rules. This would,
however, move the new approach toward a worldwide model that the pro-
ponents reject.181 This would also undermine the proponents’ goal of
achieving certainty and simplicity by allocating income among countries
purely on the basis of a mechanistic formula.182 Indeed, the proponents of
the sales location approach intend to exclude Subpart F provisions from
their new regime.183
In short, by contracting with unrelated parties, MNEs can apparently
manipulate the customer location sales factor to their substantial advan-
tage. Thus, as noted by Professor Roin:
Formulary taxation may do less to raise revenues than to prompt
the reorganization of multinationals into much smaller “tax haven
corporations” holding large amounts of intellectual property and
business risk that enter into elaborate contractual arrangements
with unrelated companies owning physical business assets.184
Two of the proponents of the sales location approach push back
against this conclusion by arguing that an MNE would not sell its products
to unrelated intermediaries because doing so would remove part of the
MNE’s distribution chain from its control and cause it to lose part of the
economic gains from vertical integration.185 U.S. MNEs, however, have
been quite willing to forfeit vertical integration benefits when a cost/bene-
180. The German exemption system would apparently make German income tax inap-
plicable. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 60, at 450.
181. See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 8, at 151 (“CFC rules are inconsistent with the
territorial impulse, because to the extent of their scope they turn territorial tax regimes into
worldwide tax systems.”).
182. See Avi-Yonah, Tax Reform, supra note 65, at 391 (“Conceptually, formulary ap-
portionment means that the United States will tax each multinational (whether U.S.- or for-
eign-based) only on the income that the formula assigns to the United States, and on no
other income.”); Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 512–13 (“The third advan-
tage associated with the proposal is the massive increase in simplicity that this would enable
for the international tax system . . . .[The] formula permits both taxpayers and the IRS to
determine the correct tax liability for each jurisdiction.”).
183. See Avi-Yonah, Tax Reform, supra note 65, at 391 (concluding that “in principle,
we could go further and abolish both subpart F and the foreign tax credit”); Durst, Statutory
Proposal, supra note 7, at 1050 (“Congress could eliminate from the code many or all of the
base company provisions of subpart F, retaining only those portions of subpart F dealing with
passive investment income.”); see also Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 512.
184. Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 233.
185. See CLAUSING & AVI-YONAH, supra note 177, at 20. But see IMF, SPILLOVERS,
supra note 6, at 41 (noting that “[i]f a destination-based measure of sales is used . . . there is
an incentive to route sales through low-tax jurisdictions (as is easy to do)”); Altshuler &
Grubert, Formula Apportionment, supra note 8, at 1178 (“If anything, it would appear that46 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
fit calculation (including tax benefits) indicated that the contracting out of
functions to unrelated parties was an optimal strategy. Furthermore, it is
possible for an MNE to deal with an unrelated party under terms which
give the MNE meaningful control over a contracted-out sales function
without having the unrelated party’s activities attributed to the MNE
under agency principles.186 Thus, a manufacturer that sells its products to
unrelated distributors under contractual terms that impose marketing and
advertising standards can contractually retain most of the advantages of
vertical integration even though distribution activity is shifted to nomi-
nally independent parties. Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude
that if two-factor formulary apportionment were adopted, many MNEs
would find that the tax benefit from selling to independent distributors
while retaining some of the advantages of vertical integration through con-
tractual terms would dictate use of the independent distributor strategy to
shift income out of the U.S. tax base. At best, this creates a significant risk
that two-factor formulary apportionment would not be a sufficient im-
provement over the current arm’s-length system to warrant incurring the
considerable transition costs of a change.187
4. Services
The Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst proposal seems to apply the sales
factor to services by treating the sales location as the place where the ser-
vices are rendered.188 With respect to services that generate a work prod-
uct suitable for electronic transmission (business consulting, tax planning,
and similar types of services), this approach would clearly constitute an
incentive to shift services income to low-tax jurisdictions by causing the
work to be done in low-tax locales and then transmitted to the customer in
a higher-tax locale.189 This aspect of the proposal would thus provide am-
ple additional income-shifting (and U.S. tax base stripping) opportunities
for service income.
rerouting sales through a reseller would be relatively inexpensive. This is particularly true for
services like downloads from the Internet.”).
186. See Rev. Rul. 76-322, 1976-2 C.B. 487 (holding that a U.S. distributor that was the
wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of a foreign manufacturer-parent was a customer of the parent,
rather than an agent, even though the subsidiary did not purchase products from the parent
until immediately prior to their resale and even though the parent stored the products with
the subsidiary subject to terms requiring the subsidiary to insure the stored products and
provide the parent with an inventory thereof whenever requested to do so by the parent);
Rev. Rul. 63-113, 1963-1 C.B. 410 (same holding where the distributor was an unrelated
party).
187. See Wilkins & Gideon, supra note 64, at 1357 (discussing the transition issues in-
volved with moving to global formulary apportionment).
188. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 541–42.
189. See e.g., Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Territoriality
in Search of Principles and Revenue: Camp and Enzi, 141 TAX NOTES 155, 171–172 (2013)
[hereinafter Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Territoriality in Search of Principles] (providing an ex-
ample of how to transform manufacturing sales income into services income). See generally
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5. Conclusion
In short, under the Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst two-factor version
of formulary apportionment, both the imputed income element and the
sales factor provide ample opportunity to shift income out of the U.S. tax
base and into low-tax foreign countries. Ironically, shifting is made possi-
ble because the proposed two-factor formulary apportionment, which does
away with explicit source rules, actually relies on de facto source rules—
location of deductible expenditures and location of sales—both of which
are substantially manipulable. In addition, transfer pricing rules would
provide no restraint on this manipulation because the two-factor formu-
lary apportionment proposal eliminates any role for such rules and their
underlying arm’s-length principle.190
D. Single-Factor Formulary Apportionment
As explained above,191 the imputed return factor of the Avi-Yonah,
Clausing and Durst proposal would seem to possess all of the income-
shifting possibilities inherent in the assets and payroll factors of three-fac-
tor formulary apportionment. Thus, the possibility has been raised of elim-
inating the imputed return factor and operating a formulary
apportionment system based entirely on the sales factor.192 We conclude
that our earlier discussion of the sales factor193 has shown that although
this single-factor approach would be simpler for both taxpayers and the
IRS than the arm’s-length regime, it would provide broad opportunities
for income shifting and erosion of the U.S. tax base.
E. A Brief Consideration of Inbound Transfer Pricing
Examples 1, 2, and 3 have involved outbound scenarios so now we will
briefly consider inbound situations. Assume that T Co, a Taiwanese manu-
facturing corporation, sets up USCo as a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary
that markets 100 percent of T Co’s products in the United States. T Co
sells its products to USCo and also licenses marketing intangibles and pro-
vides management services to USCo. Under the current U.S. international
income tax system, T Co has an incentive to shift as much income as possi-
ble out of the U.S. tax base and into the comparatively low-tax Taiwanese
tax base by overcharging USCo for the products, the intangibles, and the
services. Under the Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst two-factor formulary
apportionment system, however, T Co’s strategy is much less effective be-
190. The income-shifting opportunity created by formulary apportionment is particu-
larly ironic in view of the fact that formulary apportionment is designed to eliminate income
shifting. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 507, 509; Altshuler & Grubert,
Formula Apportionment, supra note 8, at 1146.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 165–168.
192. See Morse, Revisiting, supra note 24, at 603–06; see also Graetz & Doud, supra
note 148, at 418–19 (concluding that the sales-only approach to formulary apportionment
would be superior to the three-factor approach).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 169–187.48 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
cause the non-arm’s-length transactions between T Co and USCo are irrel-
evant. With respect to income in excess of the imputed return on T Co’s
and USCo’s deductible expenses, the governing factor is the ratio of
USCo’s U.S. sales (defined as sales to U.S. customers) to the worldwide
sales of the T Co-USCo MNE.194 On the facts of this example, that ratio is
100 percent and 100 percent of the T Co-USCo MNE’s excess income is
allocated to the United States. This suggests the possibility that the pro-
posed sales factor approach will be effective against the conventional in-
bound earnings-stripping strategies that are employed under the current
U.S. regime,195 and that the income-shifting weakness of two-factor for-
mulary apportionment is concentrated in outbound situations, such as Ex-
amples 1-3. This suggestion would not be correct.
Where the controlling corporation is a foreign entity, the two-factor
approach can present planning opportunities for inbound as well as out-
bound sales. For example, assume that I Man, an Irish manufacturing com-
pany with all of its assets and workers located in Ireland, sells 100 percent
of its products to an unrelated distributor, but structures its arrangement
to yield manufacturing services rather than sales income.196 In that case, I
Man’s sales would be Irish-source and not U.S.-source. With modest ef-
fort, other tax-avoidance approaches could be developed.
Where a foreign seller is involved, tax collection also must be ad-
dressed. If, for example, I Man sells to U.S. customers by mail order or
through the internet via a website hosted on a foreign server, the Avi-
Yonah, Clausing, and Durst two-factor approach would allocate to the
United States 100 percent of I Man’s income in excess of the imputed
return on expenses. If I Man voluntarily paid a properly calculated tax,
things would be fine for the U.S. Treasury. But in this hypothetical, I Man
has no U.S. assets or employees. Thus, the United States has little leverage
for forcing I Man to produce records that allow the IRS to validate, or not
to validate, I Man’s tax liability calculation, and there is little leverage to
force I Man to actually pay U.S. tax.197 If I Man’s U.S. customers were
businesses, then the United States could solve these problems by requiring
the customers to collect a withholding tax intentionally set to exceed I
194. See sources cited supra note 169.
195. See Wells & Lowell, Base Erosion, supra note 8, at 542–43.
196. See, Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Territoriality in Search of Principles, supra note 189,
at 170–72.
197. See generally Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 237. A close
variant of this collection problem would arise if I Man sold its products to an unrelated U.S.
distributor at a price that allowed the distributor a small resale profit margin and that de-
flected most of the U.S. sales profits to I Man. For a more legally satisfying alternative, I Man
might become an intangibles holding company that contracts with an unrelated U.S. manu-
facturer to make and sell I Man’s products in the United States under terms that deflect most
of the sales revenue to I Man as royalty income while leaving the unrelated U.S. manufac-
turer with a small profit margin. Because the unrelated contract manufacturer would bear the
U.S. production costs, those costs would not result in income being allocated to I Man under
the imputed return factor and because royalties are not sales revenue, I Man’s U.S. sales
would be zero. See generally Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 230–32.Fall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 49
Man’s true liability, with I Man being allowed to file a refund claim sup-
ported by appropriately certified records and justifications.198 If, however,
I Man’s customers were U.S. individuals, imposing such a withholding re-
quirement would be problematic.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, formulary apportionment is
problematic in the inbound scenario as well as the outbound scenario.
F. Treaty Renegotiation
An additional conundrum has to do with the U.S. income tax treaty
network. Some commentators have suggested that unilateral U.S. adop-
tion of global formulary apportionment would violate existing treaties and
require their renegotiation.199 Others have argued to the contrary.200 The
question is presently unresolved, but if it turned out that renegotiation of
the entire U.S. treaty network was required, this would be an additional,
substantial cost of switching to either three-factor, two-factor, or single-
factor global formulary apportionment.
G. Real Worldwide Taxation Redux
So how should we choose between the current badly flawed U.S. inter-
national income tax system and the formulary systems that present the
issues noted above? Before answering that question, it is helpful to recog-
nize that there are other alternatives, the best of which is to transform the
current U.S. system into a real worldwide system by eliminating deferral
and substantially curtailing cross-crediting. This approach would substan-
tially end the current tax incentive for U.S. corporations to place their
operations in foreign subsidiaries located in low-tax foreign countries be-
cause with deferral eliminated and cross-crediting substantially limited, a
current U.S. residual tax would be imposed on the profits of foreign sub-
sidiaries that previously bore only a low or zero foreign tax.201 For the
same reason, the use of aggressive transfer pricing to shift income from
U.S. corporations to low-taxed foreign subsidiaries and from high-taxed to
low-taxed foreign subsidiaries would become irrelevant and the base ero-
sion and complexity resulting from these strategies would go away because
all of the shifted income would bear a current U.S. residual tax.202 Finally,
198. See Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7 at 237.
199. See Morse, Revisiting, supra note 24, at 624–25; Roin, Can the Income Tax Be
Saved?, supra note 7, at 222; Wilkins & Gideon, supra note 64, at 1357.
200. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 523–24; Sheppard, Transfer
Pricing, supra note 5, at 473.
201. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 33, at 56; see also
Allison Christians, What the Baucus Plan Reveals About Tax Competition, 72 TAX NOTES
INT’L 1113, 1115 (2013) (explaining that imposition of a current U.S. tax would reduce the
incentive for lesser developed countries to attract investments from U.S. MNEs by offering
tax holidays and ultra-low taxes that reduce the revenues available to those countries).
202. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 33, at 58; Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, Back from the Dead: Reviving Transfer Pricing Enforcement, 73 TAX NOTES
INT’L 10, 11 (2014) (“It has also been realized for a long time that abolishing deferral deals50 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
the loss of residual tax revenue from adoption of formulary apportionment
would be avoided and the principle of ability-to-pay would be honored,
because the foreign-source income of U.S. corporations would be drawn
into the U.S. tax base.
Of course, it is fair to note that reformers have argued for the repeal
of deferral since 1961.203 Although there were brief moments of progress
in 1986 and 1993, they proved fleeting,204 and repeal of deferral is not
likely in the near term. With respect to cross-crediting, the most recent
“reform” in 2004 eliminated nearly all restrictions and substantially ex-
panded the cross-crediting opportunities for U.S. multinational corpora-
tions.205 Thus, it is prudent to point out that in the near term, at least, a
real worldwide system may not be one of the realistic options from which
the United States can select a replacement for its current defective inter-
national income tax system.206
H. A New Subpart F Category
There is, however, a more modest alternative to our preference for a
general prohibition against deferral and very severe restraints on cross-
crediting. Specifically, a new category of Subpart F income could be fash-
ioned for low-taxed foreign income, including income earned in high-tax
foreign countries and stripped out to low-tax countries. In addition, a sep-
arate foreign tax credit limitation could be created for this income.207 The
effectively with the outbound transfer pricing problem for U.S.-based MNEs.”); Roin, Can
the Income Tax Be Saved?, supra note 7, at 190; Sullivan, Key to Reform, supra note 4, at
1318 (“The only fail-safe against stateless income is a worldwide system.”); Thompson, supra
note 2, at 576–77.
203. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 488–89; Peroni, Fleming &
Shay, Getting Serious, supra note 34, at 476–91.
204. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 490–92; Peroni, Fleming &
Shay, Getting Serious, supra note 34, at 488–91.
205. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 419–23.
206. Regarding the willingness and capacity of U.S. multinational corporations to make
lobbying expenditures to defend or secure favorable income tax provisions, see Christopher
Rowland, Tax Lobbyists Help Businesses Reap Windfalls, THE B OSTON G LOBE, Mar. 17,
2013, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/03/16/corporations-record-
huge-returns-from-tax-lobbying-gridlock-congress-stalls-reform/omgZvDPa37DNlSqi0G95
YK/story.html; Adam Crowther, Lax Taxes: Industry Has Massive Resource Advantage in
Fight over Bills that Would Raise Revenue and Bring Fairness to Tax Code, PUBLIC CITIZEN
(June 6, 2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/corporate-tax-lobbying-report
.pdf.
207. See generally JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42624, MOVING TO
A TERRITORIAL INCOME TAX: OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES 41 (ed., 2012), available at http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42624.pdf; Michael J. McIntyre, A Program for International Tax
Reform, 122 TAX NOTES 1021, 1024 (2009); Sullivan, Job-Killing, supra note 3, at 467; ABA
Tax’n Sec., Report, supra note 8, at 811. For fully developed analogous proposals in the con-
text of a territorial system, see Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing, supra note 22, at 413–26;
Michael Lang, The Principle of Territoriality and Its Implementation in the Proposal for a
Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 13 FLA. TAX
REV. 305, 326–31 (2012). In prior work, we argued in favor of reforming the U.S. foreign tax
credit regime by adopting a per-country foreign tax credit limitation instead of a separateFall 2014] Putting Lipstick on a Pig? 51
new Subpart F category would have neither a same-country exception nor
a manufacturing income exception. Under this approach, low-taxed for-
eign income earned by controlled foreign corporations would be subject to
immediate U.S. taxation through the Subpart F rules. Thus, there would
be no deferral of the U.S. residual tax.208 Moreover, with low-taxed for-
eign income quarantined in a separate basket, the U.S. residual tax
thereon could not be eliminated by cross-crediting. Through this combina-
tion of reforms, the incentive to locate operations in foreign subsidiaries
that bear low foreign taxes would be removed and the incentive to shift
income to low-taxed foreign subsidiaries through aggressive transfer pric-
ing and other strategies would likewise be eliminated. This proposal is
very similar to the subject-to-tax rule that is part of any well-designed ter-
ritorial system. It requires a definition of “low foreign tax,” but as we have
explained in other work,209 that is a solvable problem.
This proposal could have a significant simplifying impact on the struc-
ture of Subpart F because each of the existing Subpart F foreign base com-
pany income categories is designed to impose a current U.S. tax on a
narrow type of low-taxed foreign income. Since the proposal would sub-
ject all low-taxed foreign income to a current U.S. tax, the foreign base
company income provisions would be mostly vestigial and could be re-
pealed or significantly simplified, at the least.
Finally, this Subpart F proposal would respond to stateless income/
homeless income strategies that allow income to be stripped from high-tax
countries to low-tax countries thereby transforming high-taxed foreign in-
come into low-taxed foreign income that is protected from U.S. residual
taxation by deferral and cross-crediting. To illustrate this point, assume
basket for low-taxed foreign income. See Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen
E. Shay, Reform and Simplification of the U.S. Foreign Tax Credit Rules, 101 TAX NOTES 103,
111–12, 121–13, 133 (2003). We continue to prefer a per-country limitation as the best ap-
proach for a broad reform of the U.S. foreign tax credit scheme. In the present context,
however, where we are dealing narrowly with the problem of deferral and cross-crediting
rather than with fundamental foreign tax credit reform, we conclude that creating a new
Subpart F category for low-taxed foreign income and coupling it with a foreign tax credit
basket for low-taxed foreign income would be an improvement over current law.
208. Professor Kingson has suggested another alternative to complete repeal of deferral
and cross-crediting. He suggests repealing Section 1297(d) so that a controlled foreign corpo-
ration that becomes heavily invested in passive-income-producing assets (see I.R.C. § 1297(a)
(2014)) such as intangibles, would fall under the PFIC regime (I.R.C. §§ 1291–98 (2014)).
The result would be that the controlled foreign corporation’s income would bear either a
current tax or a deferral-compensating interest charge. See Kingson, supra note 54. We agree
that this would be a helpful reform that would address some of the most egregious stateless/
homeless income strategies. It would not, however, reach the scenario illustrated by the ex-
ample in Section I, above, see supra text accompanying notes 34–42, because the controlled
foreign corporation in that example is primarily engaged in active business operations with
production assets and uses its retained profits to “grow” these operations rather than to ac-
quire passive assets. By contrast, either repeal of deferral and cross-crediting or creation of a
new low-taxed income Subpart F category with a separate foreign tax credit limitation would
deal with the example in Section I.
209. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing, supra note 22, at 413–21.52 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
that DP in the example in Section I210 has a manufacturing subsidiary,
FS1, incorporated in a high-tax country, and a patent holding entity, FS2,
incorporated in a low-tax country, and that FS2 has licensed patents to
FS1 for use in its business. Also assume that FS2 is a disregarded entity
under the U.S. check-the-box rules but is treated as a corporation under
the laws of FS1’s residence country. The royalties paid by FS1 to FS2 are a
deductible business expense under FS1’s residence country law so that no
tax is paid to that country on that portion of FS1’s income. The only tax
imposed on the royalties is the low tax in FS2’s residence country. Because
FS2 is a disregarded entity for U.S. tax purposes, those royalties are ig-
nored by the United States and are not treated as Subpart F income. To
the extent of the royalties, FS1’s income has morphed from high-foreign-
taxed income into low-foreign-taxed income and because of deferral and
cross-crediting, the U.S. residual tax on that low-taxed foreign income can
be eliminated.211
Under the preceding Subpart F proposal, however, the disregarded
entity status of FS2 would mean that to the extent of the ignored royalty
payments by FS1 to FS2, the look-through rule in Section 954(c)(6) would
be irrelevant, even if its effective date were extended, and FS1 has low-
taxed Subpart F income that is subject to a current U.S. residual tax. This
means that the check-the-box rules can be retained, in this scenario at
least, to serve their original purpose as a simplifying substitute212 for the
Morrissey213 corporate resemblance test, and not as a base erosion truck
hole. Moreover, if FS2 were not a disregarded entity, it would be a con-
trolled foreign corporation. Thus, the royalties received from FS1 would
be low-taxed foreign income for purposes of the Subpart F proposal and
Section 954(c)(6), which applies only to foreign personal holding company
income, would be trumped.
I. Summary
In previous work, we explained why the current U.S. international in-
come tax regime is not a true worldwide system and is inferior to a princi-
pled territorial system of the traditional kind.214 For the same reasons, two
of us regard the present incoherent U.S. regime as inferior to the alterna-
tives of a properly designed three-factor, two-factor, or single-factor global
formulary apportionment system. We unanimously conclude, however,
that a real U.S. worldwide system, without deferral and significant cross-
210. See supra text accompanying notes 34–42.
211. For variations on this theme, see Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 4, at
706–13, 731–32; Miller, Investment Through Tax Havens, supra note 32, at 169–170; Wells &
Lowell, Base Erosion, supra note 8, at 543–44.
212. See Notice 95–14, 1995–1 C.B. 297.
213. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
214. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than Exemption, supra note 12; see also Grub-
ert & Altshuler, Fixing the System, supra note 5, at 675 (“It is hard to argue that the current
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crediting, would be superior to all of the formulary approaches.215 Reten-
tion of the current U.S. regime with the addition of a new Subpart F cate-
gory for low-taxed foreign income, coupled with a new foreign tax credit
limitation basket, would be the optimal “second best” alternative.216 From
that standpoint, global formulary apportionment must be given a failing
grade.217 Thus, it will be disappointing if any of the three versions of
global formulary apportionment turns out to be the “winner” in the con-
test to replace the current U.S. system, because all three forms of global
formulary apportionment are merely the problematic territoriality pig with
some lipstick slapped on.
VI. LIMITED FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT
Arguably, the principal weakness of the arm’s-length approach is its
inability to control tax-motivated transfer pricing with respect to intra-
MNE shifting of income from intangibles.218 This weakness is currently
being advanced as a major argument for replacing the incoherent, elective,
de facto U.S. territorial system with an explicit territorial system based on
global formulary apportionment.219 However, as we explained in earlier
parts of this Article,220 this is not the best way to deal with the weaknesses
of arm’s-length transfer pricing and, therefore, is not a sufficient basis for
moving to global formulary apportionment. Adoption of a real worldwide
system221 is the preferred approach because it addresses tax-motivated
transfer pricing without the distortive effects222 and manipulation poten-
tial223 that characterize global formulary apportionment.
A real worldwide system would impose current U.S. taxation on the
foreign-source income, including intangible income, of U.S. MNEs. This
current U.S. tax on foreign-source intangible income, regardless of where
that income is geographically shifted within an MNE, would largely elimi-
215. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 32; see also Kleinbard, Les-
sons, supra note 8, at 134–55.
216. See also Benshalom, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 443–49 (proposing that invest-
ments by U.S. MNEs in foreign subsidiaries, whether in the form of debt or equity, be treated
as generating currently taxable, market-rate imputed interest income streams to the U.S.
MNE parent corporations).
217. See also Wilkins & Gideon, supra note 64 (generally describing the administrative
difficulties of operating global formulary apportionment). For views that, nevertheless,
strongly favor global formulary apportionment, see PICCIOTTO, supra note 121; Avi-Yonah,
Clausing & Durst, supra note 2.
218. See JOINT COMM., INCOME SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 110; OECD ACTION PLAN,
supra note 24, at 19–20; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Xilinx and the Arm’s-Length Standard, 123
TAX NOTES 1231 (2009); Edward D. Kleinbard, Throw Territorial Taxation from the Train,
114 TAX NOTES 547, 552–54 (2007).
219. See PICCIOTTO, supra note 121; Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 2, at 500,
504, 507.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 66–72, 201–213.
221. For a description of a real worldwide system, see supra text accompanying note 68.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 122–124, 142–148, 165–168.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 148–150, 169–187.54 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:1
nate the reward for moving the income to low-tax foreign countries. With
that reward erased, the weakness of the arm’s-length approach in dealing
with intangible income shifting would be largely irrelevant.
It is true that apportionment of intangible income would remain a
technical issue under a worldwide system because income would still have
to be characterized as foreign-source or domestic-source for purposes of
the U.S. foreign tax credit limitation.224 There would, however, be no for-
eign tax credit reward for artificially shifting income to low-tax countries
to absorb excess foreign tax credits through cross-crediting.225 Thus, so far
as the U.S. system is concerned, real worldwide taxation would make for-
eign tax credit planning a neutral factor regarding where to locate intangi-
ble income.
Under a real U.S. worldwide system of international taxation, there
would continue to be gains for U.S. MNEs through earning intangible in-
come at large before-tax rates of return in high-tax foreign countries while
shifting that income to low-tax foreign countries where it bears a low rate
of tax—a tactic that Professor Kleinbard has characterized as capturing
“tax rents.”226 However, those gains would be diminished by the current
U.S. residual tax on income shifted to low-tax countries and any remaining
gains are a problem to be solved by the high-tax countries.
Nevertheless, even though there would be no meaningful foreign tax
credit advantages resulting from shifting intangible income under a real
worldwide system, income would still have to be characterized as domes-
tic-source or foreign-source for purposes of the foreign tax credit limita-
tion. More importantly, because of the historical lack of success in moving
the United States to a real worldwide system and because of uncertainty
over whether the transition costs of replacing the present U.S. system with
a global formulary apportionment system would be justified by the uncer-
tain gains from this change, it is quite likely that the United States will
retain its existing system that is characterized by deferral, cross-crediting,
and abundant income shifting. Application of a so-called arm’s-length
method in a formalistic manner that elevates an unrelated party transac-
tion to a talismanic blessing of unrealistic outcomes in contexts in which
there are no genuine comparable transactions has been proven particu-
larly feeble under the present U.S. system in dealing with income gener-
ated by intangible property.227 For all these reasons, it is appropriate to
think about whether there are limited, as opposed to global, formulary
approaches to intangible income transfer price regulation that could be
used under the arm’s-length method as required by U.S. multilateral in-
224. See I.R.C. § 904(a) (2014).
225. A real worldwide system would prevent excess foreign tax credits generated in
high-tax countries from being used to absorb (i.e., cross credited against) the U.S. residual
tax on income earned in low-tax foreign countries.
226. See Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 4, at 752–57.
227. See Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm’r, 598 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’g 125 T.C. 37 (2005);
Veritas Software v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 297 (2009). See generally JOINT COMM., INCOME SHIFT-
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come tax treaties.228 We believe that the arm’s-length approach, properly
conceived as a method for achieving outcomes consistent with what would
be expected in an arm’s-length context involving the same facts, clearly
would encompass formulas that rely on using objective metrics to divide
profits. A full-blown review of this point would involve an extensive tech-
nical analysis of transfer pricing law that is outside the scope of this Arti-
cle. Consequently, we will limit ourselves to a few suggestions for future
investigation.
First, since a major weakness of the arm’s-length method with respect
to intangible income is the lack of truly comparable transactions,229 it is
worth noting that the United States has two existing transfer pricing meth-
ods for dealing with intangible income that do not rely on comparable
transaction data—the residual profit split method230 and the cost sharing
method.231 Thought should be given to making these two approaches the
mandatory transfer pricing methods for intangible income, thus circum-
venting the problem of a paucity of comparable transaction data and also
restricting the present freedom of taxpayers to opportunistically cherry-
pick among methods by choosing whichever approach produces the most
favorable result in each particular case.232
However, commentators have criticized these approaches, particularly
cost sharing, on the ground that either through happenstance or taxpayer
chicanery, they too often, in retrospect, greatly understate the income that
should be allocated to the U.S. tax base.233 We suggest investigating the
feasibility of handling this problem by strengthening the power (and will-
ingness) of the IRS to make ex post adjustments through the commensu-
rate with income principle contained in Section 482.234 This could be done
by limiting the exceptions to, and constraints on, the IRS’s current ex post
adjustment powers and by reducing the range within which transfer pricing
outcomes are protected from the ex post adjustment power.235 If this ap-
228. See IMF, SPILLOVERS, supra note 6, at 41–42; Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, supra note
2, at 383; Brauner, BEPS, supra note 135, at 97–100; Morse, Revisiting, supra note 24, at
626–27, 639; Sheppard, Transfer Pricing, supra note 5, at 470, 473–74.
229. See supra note 57.
230. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482–6(c)(3) (2009); JOINT C OMM., INCOME S HIFTING, supra
note 8, at 25; GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 1046.
231. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482–7 (2013); JOINT COMM., INCOME SHIFTING, supra note 8, at
25-29; GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 2, at 1050–68.
232. See Morse, Transfer Pricing Regs, supra note 104, at 1423 (stating that the Section
482 regulations “give too much away, in large part because they permit taxpayers to whipsaw
the government at every turn by (1) choosing the most advantageous income and deduction
assignment and sourcing methods for each particular set of taxpayer facts and (2) massaging
the facts, for example through valuation analysis, to further improve the results”).
233. See, e.g., Morse, Transfer Pricing Regs, supra note 104, at 1424–26; Sheppard,
Transfer Pricing, supra note 5, at 470.
234. See JOINT COMM., INCOME SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 18–20; GUSTAFSON, PERONI
& PUGH, supra note 2, at 1039–40.
235. See JOINT COMM., INCOME SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 25, 28; GUSTAFSON, PERONI
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proach were taken, then it may be appropriate to consider modifications
to the transfer pricing penalty structure.236 Congress adopted those penal-
ties in the context of relatively feeble IRS enforcement powers. If the IRS
were given a much more robust power to retrospectively revisit transfer
pricing arrangements that had turned out to disproportionately disadvan-
tage the Treasury, then in some contexts penalties may not be appropriate.
These issues are, however, points for investigation in a future project.
One last point bears mentioning here. A more limited form of formu-
lary apportionment also could be used to determine the source (domestic
or foreign) of other types of income for which traditional sourcing rules do
not work well.237 Examples include global trading income, shipping in-
come, and international communications income. In such cases, a modified
and limited form of formulary apportionment would be used solely to de-
termine the source of such income and then the normal U.S. international
income tax rules (as revised in accordance with the suggestions set forth
above to make the U.S. system a more robust worldwide system) would be
applied to the domestic- and foreign-source portions of the income.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps surprisingly, this Article has shown that the debate over for-
mulary apportionment is little more than an alternative path to the larger
debate over worldwide taxation versus territorial taxation. The present
U.S. international income tax regime for U.S. MNEs is an implicit, overly-
generous, and incoherent quasi-territorial system that relies on residence
rules, source rules, and the arm’s-length approach to apportion interna-
tional business profits between domestic income that is currently taxable
by the United States and foreign income that is effectively exempt, or
nearly so, from U.S. taxation because of deferral and cross-crediting. This
version of territoriality is quite ugly because it is highly complex and it
imposes only modest restraints on the ability of U.S. MNEs to shift income
out of the U.S. tax base to low-tax foreign countries.
Four forms of explicit territoriality have been proposed as alternatives
to the current U.S. system. The first is traditional territoriality, which relies
on source rules and the arm’s-length approach to apportion international
business profits between taxable domestic income and exempt foreign in-
come. This is a simpler regime than the current U.S. system because it
confers exemption directly rather than implicitly through deferral and
cross-crediting.238 It does, however, preserve the capacity of taxpayers to
shift income to low-tax foreign countries subject only to the modest re-
straint imposed by the arm’s-length approach. Most importantly, it is in-
consistent with the principle of ability-to-pay and it provides a powerful
incentive to locate business activity in low-tax foreign countries.
236. See I.R.C. § 6662(e), (h) (2014).
237. See Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 124, at 1002–03 n.78.
238. For a colorful description of the complexity of cross-crediting, see Kleinbard, State-
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The other three forms of territoriality that are currently part of the
debate are three-factor, two-factor, and single-factor global formulary ap-
portionment. Each of them is simpler than either the current U.S. system
or traditional territoriality, but each of them leaves U.S. MNEs with con-
siderable capacity to accomplish erosion of the U.S. tax base through in-
come shifting and each of them shares the defects of traditional
territoriality regarding inconsistency with the ability-to-pay principle and
distortion of business activity. Thus, U.S. policy makers are left with a
choice between a normatively flawed and distortive territoriality that im-
poses modest restraints on income shifting through the arm’s-length ap-
proach (i.e., both the current U.S. system of de facto territoriality and
traditional territoriality) and a simpler but normatively flawed and distor-
tive territoriality that still allows a substantial amount of income shifting
(i.e., three-factor, two-factor, and single-factor global formulary appor-
tionment). This unhappy dilemma can be avoided by adopting real world-
wide taxation or, alternatively, by keeping the current regime while
creating a Subpart F income category for low-taxed foreign income and
insulating that category from cross-crediting with a separate foreign tax
credit limitation basket. A more limited form of formulary apportionment
then should be used for, and tailored to, particular forms of income, such
as intangible income and global trading income, that present discrete taxa-
tion problems. Nevertheless, when such income is earned by a U.S. MNE,
allocation of income to a foreign jurisdiction under this more limited form
of formulary apportionment should not ipso facto result in the income be-
ing exempted from U.S. taxation.